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H I G H L I G H T S
 Practopoiesis proposes the princi-
ples by which adaptive systems
organize.
 It is a general theory of what it takes
to be biologically intelligent.
 The theory is general because it is
grounded in the principles of cyber-
netics.
 Being general, the theory is applic-
able also to artiﬁcial intelligence
technologies.
 The theory makes empirical predic-
tions about the mechanisms of
neural adaptation.
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a b s t r a c t
The mind is a biological phenomenon. Thus, biological principles of organization should also be the principles
underlying mental operations. Practopoiesis states that the key for achieving intelligence through adaptation is
an arrangement in which mechanisms laying at a lower level of organization, by their operations and
interaction with the environment, enable creation of mechanisms laying at a higher level of organization.
When such an organizational advance of a system occurs, it is called a traverse. A case of traverse is when
plasticity mechanisms (at a lower level of organization), by their operations, create a neural network anatomy
(at a higher level of organization). Another case is the actual production of behavior by that network, whereby
the mechanisms of neuronal activity operate to create motor actions. Practopoietic theory explains why the
adaptability of a system increases with each increase in the number of traverses. With a larger number of
traverses, a system can be relatively small and yet, produce a higher degree of adaptive/intelligent behavior
than a system with a lower number of traverses. The present analyses indicate that the two well-known
traverses – neural plasticity and neural activity – are not sufﬁcient to explain human mental capabilities. At
least one additional traverse is needed, which is named anapoiesis for its contribution in reconstructing
knowledge e.g., from long-term memory into working memory. The conclusions bear implications for brain
theory, the mind–body explanatory gap, and developments of artiﬁcial intelligence technologies.
& 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
To help solve the brain–body problem (Descartes, 1983; Popper,
1999; Chalmers, 1996; Rust, 2009), systems neuroscience needs to
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near-decompose (Simon, 1994; Bechtel and Richardson, 1993)1 the
complex biology of the brain into simple components. Likewise,
biology is still in a need of a general theory of interactions that
would explain relationships between its different levels of orga-
nization (Noble, 2008a, 2008b; Bateson, 2004). The present work
is an attempt to develop a theory that satisﬁes both of these needs.
The heart of the present approach can be illustrated through the role
that plasticity mechanisms play in neural networks. Be it a biological
network or one simulated on a computer, without plasticity mechan-
isms, it would be impossible to endow the network with the structure
necessary to accomplish its tasks across different environments if each
environment poses different demands. Plasticity mechanisms are the
means of steering the network into the desirable state of operation.
Once created, the network offers another mechanism of equal steering
importance: neural activity. The muscles and skeleton of a body provide
machinery to generate movement and behavior. But they are useless
without a network of neurons, which controls those movements.
Neurons with their electro-chemical activity, and through inhibition/
excitation, steer effectors and ultimately give life to the motion of the
body. The present approach emphasizes that what plasticity is for a
network, the network is for behavior: In both cases there is an enabling
force. Both forces need to work well, and they lie in an organizational
hierarchy: The rules of plasticity are organizationally lower than net-
work anatomy, and anatomy is organizationally lower than the gener-
ated behavior. It is always that higher levels are a result of operations of
lower levels and not the other way around.
The present work generalizes this lower-to-higher relationship
and proposes a formal theory. This makes it possible to ask what
happens if there are not only two adaptive mechanisms (plasticity
and neural activity) but three (e.g., in case of an organism and its
brain and mind) or four (in case of evolution operating on an entire
species). Would more levels produce more intelligent behavior and
how many levels are really used by biological systems?
The theory is named practopoiesis—derived from Ancient Greek
words πρᾶξις (praksis), meaning “action, activity, practice” and ποίησις
(poiesis), from ποιέω (poieo), “to make”. The term practopoiesis refers
to “creation of actions”, emphasizing the fact that physiological
mechanisms at any level of adaptive organization operate through
actions—and requires mechanisms to be put in place capable of
executing those actions. For example, gene expression mechanisms
act, plasticity mechanisms act, and neurons act. All of those mechan-
isms need to be properly created. The name practopoiesis is also a
tribute to the theory of autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980,
1992), which is one of the precursors to the present work—providing
the insights that the process of creating new structures, or poiesis, in
biological systems underlies both the physiology of an organism and
its mental operations (see also Thompson, 2007).
Another theory that is a precursor to practopoiesis is self-
organization (Ashby, 1947; Anrew, 1979; Szentágothai and Érdi,
1989). Practopoiesis can be considered a speciﬁc implementation of
the principles of self-organization namely those applicable to
biological processes. While self-organization generally applies also
to non-biological phenomena (such as galaxies or chemical reac-
tions), practopoiesis applies exclusively to adaptive systems. This
allows practopoiesis to specify more accurate the organization
principles, which happen to be founded in several theorems
fundamental to cybernetics (Ashby, 1956; Conant and Ashby,
1970). Being less general than self-organization practopoiesis
applies only to a subset of all the processes of self-organization
that take place within an organism. Practopoiesis is concerned only
with those aspects that enable the organism to adapt to newly
emerging circumstances in its environment. For example, retino-
topic mapping between the eye and the structures in the central
nervous system is established through self-organization. However,
some of these processes may occur with intrinsic rhythms only,
without a need for inputs from the environment (Szentágothai and
Érdi, 1989; Eglen and Gjorgjieva, 2009). Others require adaptive
changes made in response to the current state of the environment
(e.g., Singer and Tretter, 1976; Singer et al., 1981). Practopoiesis
applies only to the latter ones. The explanatory power that
practopoiesis brings to the problem of mind and brain is the
suggestion proposed at the end of this manuscript stating that
mental operations are by their nature adaptive. Hence, the princi-
ples of practopoiesis provide the right tools for understanding how,
through self-organization of the system, the mental emerges out of
physical.
2. Practopoiesis: A general theory of adaptive systems
One of the key postulates of practopoiesis is the necessity of
interactions with the environment. The idea is that each adaptive
mechanism, at any level of (self-) organization, receives feedback
from the environment. That way, practopoiesis follows the tradi-
tions of, and is in a general agreement with the ecological approach
to mental operations (Gibson, 1977, 1979), enactivism (Varela et al.,
1991; Noë, 2012), externalism (Holt, 1914; Brooks, 1991) and other
works concerning situated and embodied cognition (e.g., Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980; Damasio, 1999; McGann et al., 2013; Di Paolo and De
Jaegher, 2012), and robotics (Brooks, 1999). Also, various preceding
works considering feedback interactions (Friston, 2010; Shipp et al.,
2013; Friston et al., 2012; Bernstein, 1967; Powers, 1973) provide
important background for the present work.
Practopoiesis can be fundamentally considered a cybernetic theory.
Cybernetics studies control systems based on feedback loops (e.g.
Wiener, 1961) (Fig. 1A). Practopoiesis is grounded in the theorems of
cybernetics—foremost, the law of requisite variety (Ashby, 1956; Beer,
1974, 1979) and the good regulator theorem (Conant and Ashby, 1970).
Practopoiesis is an extension in a sense that it explains how systems
obtain their cybernetic capabilities i.e., how they learn what and
where to control. Hence, practopoiesis can be understood as a form of
a second-order cybernetics, or cybernetics-of-cybernetics (Heylighen
and Joslyn, 2001; Glanville, 2002; von Foerster, 2003).
2.1. Three main telltale signs of practopoietic systems
To determine whether a system has the capability to learn to
control, these properties must be observed:
(1) Monitor-and-act machinery: An adaptive system must consist of
components that are capable of detecting conditions for a
necessity to act, and of acting. These components monitor their
own surrounding world, make changes through actions, and
then evaluate the effects e.g., determine whether further
actions are needed. For example, gene expression mechanisms
constitute one type of monitor-and-act units. Neurons consti-
tute another type of monitor-and-act units.
(2) Poietic hierarchy: The monitor-and-act units are organized into
a hierarchy in which low-level components, by their actions,
create, adjust, service and nourish high-level components.
Once created, higher-level components can in principle oper-
ate on their own. That is, at least for some time, they do not
require further engagements of the lower-level components.
This is achieved by creating new physical structures that
constitute higher-level monitor-and-act units. For example,
gene expression mechanisms create neurons and determine
their properties, but not the other way around.
1 According to Bechtel and Richardson (1993): ”A system will be nearly
decomposable to the extent that the causal interactions within subsystems are
more important in determining component properties than are the causal inter-
actions between subsystems”.
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(3) Level-speciﬁc environmental feedback: Monitor-and-act compo-
nents receive necessarily feedback from the environment to
which the system is adapting. This means that units at
different levels of organization receive different type of feed-
back. For example, neurons constituting a patellar reﬂex
receive different type of feedback from the environment than
the gene expressionmechanisms that build that reﬂexmechanism
on the ﬁrst place.
These properties can be illustrated by a simple interaction
graph (Fig. 1B): The monitor-and-act units operating at the top of
the hierarchy can be described as classical cybernetic systems (as
in Fig. 1A). However, other units, lower on the hierarchy, add
complexity to the system. These units monitor the effects that the
top of the hierarchy produces on the environment and, when
necessary, make alterations. For as long as higher-level compo-
nents satisfy the needs of an organism, there will be no need for
changes at lower levels of system organization. But if higher-level
components are unsuitable, they are being poietically adjusted. For
full functioning, two types of feedback from the environment are
required, one for each level (Fig. 1B). In case that a low level fails to
receive feedback from the environment but instead receives feed-
back only from within the system, the system’s capability to adapt
to the environment at that level of organization is lost. In that case
no separate levels of practopoietic organization can be claimed.
2.2. The main desideratum: Cybernetic knowledge
To work properly and harmoniously with an environment, every
component of a system must be adjusted according to its environ-
ment. The proper adjustment can be referred to as cybernetic knowl-
edge of that component e.g., knowledge on when to act and how
(Ashby, 1956). Cybernetic knowledge is necessarily subjected to good
regulator theorem of Conant and Ashby (1970), stating: “any successful
control mechanism must be a model of the system that it controls”.
That is, one can deal with the surrounding world successfully only if
one already possesses certain knowledge about the effects that one’s
actions are likely to exert on that world2. Maturana and Varela (1980,
1992) expressed it as: “All doing is knowing and all knowing is doing.”
The combination of poiesis and level-speciﬁc environmental feed-
back has the following implication: The process of building the system
is also the process of adapting the system, which is also the very
process of acquiring cybernetic knowledge. Building a system through
interaction with an environment and adjusting to it cannot be
distinguished from acquiring cybernetic knowledge about this envir-
onment. That way, newly created structures become a model (Conant
and Ashby, 1970) of the system’s environment. For example, variation
in phenotype for the same genotype (Johanssen, 1911) is a form of
practopoietic extraction of knowledge3. Formation of neural network
architecture (e.g., synaptic connectivity) through interactions with the
environment is also a form of extraction of cybernetic knowledge.
2.3. Knowledge requires variety
The total amount of cybernetic knowledge deposited within a
system is related to the total number of different states that the system
can assume while interacting with the environment, and is referred to
as the cybernetic variety of the system. The demands on variety are
Fig. 1. Cybernetic systems and the acquisition of cybernetic knowledge through
practopoiesis. (A) Interaction graph of a classical cybernetic control system imple-
menting monitor-and-act machinery. (B) The basic principle of practopoietic acquisi-
tion of cybernetic knowledge. If subsystem (i) represents a classical cybernetic system
like the one in (A) and operates at a higher level of organization, the subsystem (ii)
operates at a lower level of organization to make changes to (i) such that (i) obtains
proper cybernetic knowledge. Actions performed by (ii) have poietic effects on (i) and
for that require feedback from the environment. The three dots indicate that this
organizational relationship can be generalized as yet another subsystem may provide
cybernetic knowledge for (ii). (C) Graphs of the relationships in the speciﬁcity/
generality of cybernetic knowledge or knowledge graphs, shown for the components
of systems in (A) (left) and (B) (right). Left: The system exhibits two levels of
knowledge, i.e. two levels of organization (spheres): It contains general knowledge
about the rules of control in the form of the system architecture, and more speciﬁc
knowledge about the current states in the form of its input/output values. The arrow
indicates the transition i.e., traverse, of knowledge from general to speciﬁc, which is a
function of the operation of the system. Right: The system has one more level of
organization and thus, one more traverse. The most general knowledge is that
containing the rules for changing system architecture. The levels of organization are
indicated by top, top-1, etc. The relative sizes of spheres indicate the total amount of
knowledge stored at each level of organization i.e., its cybernetic variety.
2 Monitor-and-act components offer a much more complete descriptor of an
adaptive system than the concept of represented information. The latter requires
additional mechanisms to be deﬁned for encoding and decoding information. In
other words, besides the memory, a mechanism for computation is required—
something that has the knowledge of the code. In contrast, a monitor-and-act unit
houses both “memory storage” and “processor” under the same roof. It is a
complete action system that autonomously performs the entire cycle of detecting
information, acting on it and observing the effects of the action. In other words, the
symbols providing information require an external grounding process. In contrast,
a monitor-and-act unit possesses already by itself everything necessary to operate.
3 The practopoietic process is very much different from building a system from
a pre-deﬁned plan. When building predeﬁned systems no feedback is needed. In
contrast, during the knowledge acquisition of poiesis low-level components receive
environmental feedback that necessarily guides the creation of new structures.
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determined by Ashby’s law of requisite variety (Ashby, 1956; Beer, 1974,
1979), which states that for a successful control of a system, the
system that controls has to have at least as many states as the system
being controlled. Thus, being a good model of the environment entails
a sufﬁcient number of states, which is a pre-requirement to store a
sufﬁcient amount of cybernetic knowledge within the systems.
2.4. Practopoietic transcendence of knowledge: Generality-speciﬁcity
hierarchy
The contribution that practopoietic theory brings on top of the
existing cybernetic theory is the introduction of the adaptive
hierarchy. This hierarchy implies a speciﬁc relation between the
cybernetic knowledge that drives a poietic process and the knowl-
edge that has been extracted through that process: The knowledge
that can be instilled at a new level of organization is always
limited by what the system had known prior to the process of
poiesis: higher-level knowledge is always a speciﬁc case of lower-
level knowledge. Kant referred to this limitation as transcendence
of knowledge (Kant et al., 1998). In machine learning, this system
property is known as inductive bias (Mitchell, 1980).
A higher level of organization contains knowledge about how
the environment has previously responded to the actions at lower
levels. Consequently, the relationship between knowledge levels
can be always described as a change in knowledge speciﬁcity along
the organizational hierarchy. Knowledge at a higher-level system
organization must always be a speciﬁc case of more general
knowledge at a lower level of organization4.
This relation can be shown even in the simplest, non-biological
forms of cybernetic systems. For example, a thermostat with a sensor
and a heater can be deemed a simple monitor-and-act unit possessing
cybernetic knowledge on how to keep a space comfortably warm. This
unit has two levels of organization, general and speciﬁc: The general
knowledge of that system can be expressed as a relation between the
input (current temperature) and the output (heating intensity). For
example, output¼(target input)/3. Speciﬁc knowledge is then derived
by the actions of this controller. For example, speciﬁcally, right now
inputmay be 35, and targetmay be 20. The needed output is thus 5.
In biology, an example of the generality-speciﬁcity relation is the
general rule about when and which proteins should be synthesized
versus the speciﬁc proteins that have been synthesized and resulted in a
certain phenotype. The latter reﬂects the properties of a particular
environment within which the system operated recently, whilst the
former reﬂects the properties of the environment across a range of time
and space covered by the evolution of the organism. Thus, a phenotype
will always contain more speciﬁc knowledge than the genotype.
The generality-speciﬁcity relationship applies not only to the
gene-to-protein relationship but also to higher levels of system
organization. The anatomical connectivity of a nervous system
reﬂects more general cybernetic knowledge than that of neuronal
activity: The anatomy contains knowledge on what to do in general,
across a range of sensory inputs, whilst the current electrical state of
the network contains the knowledge of what is going on right now.
The graphs of interactions within real cybernetic systems (e.g.,
Fig. 1A and B) can be quite complex if the variety of the system is
large. Hence, knowledge graphs can be introduced, with which the
essential practopoietic relationships between different levels of
knowledge organization can be illustrated. Fig. 1C-left illustrates
the simplest knowledge graph for a control system (e.g. a thermo-
stat): architecture is more general than the current state. The
knowledge provided in the form of architecture is used to extract
more speciﬁc knowledge in a form of system state (the sizes of the
circles in knowledge graphs can be used to indicate the relative
variety at each level).
But this needs not be the limit. Additional mechanisms may
increase the adaptability in a form of adjusting system architecture
(Fig. 1B and C-right). Such low-level adjustments of architecture
using environmental feedback are known as supervised learning
e.g., the back-propagation algorithm (Rummelhart et al., 1986)
(illustrated in Fig. 2A as an interaction graph), or as activity-
dependent plasticity (Dubner and Ruda, 1992; Ganguly and Poo,
2013) (illustrated in Fig. 2B as a knowledge graph). In either case,
the system has three levels of organization.
In Fig. 2, the knowledge stored in the rules of the plasticity
mechanisms lies at the lowest level of organization. The application
of these rules leads to extraction of new knowledge at the anatomical
level. The application of anatomical knowledge leads to the extrac-
tion of new knowledge at the highest level of organization—the
activity of neurons and consequent generation of input–output
interactions i.e., behavior. Thus, ultimately, every behavioral act is a
speciﬁc expression of the general knowledge stored in our learning
mechanisms (i.e., our genes). Our genes know what is good for our
survival and proliferation in general. Our behavioral acts know what
should be done speciﬁcally in a given situation—right now.
In conclusion, the set of all kinds of speciﬁc knowledge that a system
can possibly learn is limited by the general knowledge that a system
begins its life with. One cannot learn speciﬁcs for which one has not
already pre-evolved a more general learning system. Ultimately, every
skill that we acquire and every declarative fact we memorize is a speciﬁc
form of general knowledge provided by our genes (e.g. Baum, 2004).
2.5. Traverse is a generator of variety
The introduction of the practopoietic hierarchy implies that the
transition from high to low generality of knowledge is an active
process. We refer to this process here as an adaptive traverse of
knowledge, or simply a traverse. A traverse is a process, or a set of
operations, by which changes are made through system’s interac-
tion with the environment such that the system has acquired new
operational capabilities, or has directly adjusted its environment to
its needs. Whenever a system operates i.e. its monitor-and-act
units are engaged, the system executes a traverse. The number of
traverses that a system possesses and executes depends on its
organization. This number is affected primarily by the number of
levels at which the system interacts with its environment, which
in turn determines the number of levels at which that system
makes changes to itself. Systems with one traverse interact with
the environment directly and make no changes to themselves. An
additional traverse is needed to make changes to itself in which
case the interaction with the environment becomes indirect—
through the functioning of the other traverses that the self-
changes have affected. For the system to be adaptive each of the
traverses has to receive feedback from the environment—and each
feedback has to provide a speciﬁc type of information, relevant for
the monitor-and-act units of this particular traverse. Whenever
there is more than one traverse, the lower one on the hierarchy
always determines how the upper one operates. Formally, we can
4 High and low levels of organization in practopoiesis may seem counter-
intuitive and they may stand in opposition to traditional deﬁnitions of hierarchies
in the brain whereby the highest element is the one that has the most decision
power. These are hierarchies of power control. In contrast, practopoiesis is a
hierarchy of organization levels. In practopoiesis, more highly organized compo-
nent is the one that cannot operate without the guidance of the lower one. For
example, one may see genes as having very high decision power, higher than e.g.,
behavior: Genes can determine behavior and behavior cannot directly determine
genes. Nevertheless, genes operate at a lower level of system organization than
does behavior. Similarly, in a management structure of a social organization, the
highest decision power (e.g., a CEO) does not coincide with the highest level of
system organization. The result of the collective action of all the employees may
constitute a much higher form of organization than the guiding actions of the CEO.
The main concern of practopoietic theory is the level of organization, rather than
the decision power.
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deﬁne a traverse as a process in which more general cybernetic
knowledge has been used throughout the operations of the system
to extract more speciﬁc cybernetic knowledge. Note that the total
number of levels of organization that possess cybernetic knowl-
edge is always larger by one than the number of traverses within
the system (indicated by arrows in knowledge graphs). This is
because the top level of organization produces output5, which
affects the environment instead of poietically affecting the
system6.
An example of a traverse is when the general knowledge of
network plasticity mechanisms – about when and what to change
anatomically – creates new functional capabilities—e.g., on when
and how to respond to sensory stimuli. Yet another traverse at a
higher level of organization occurs when this network operates by
closing sensory-motor loops and creating behavior. In both exam-
ples, more general knowledge is applied to create more speciﬁc
one. One more example of a traverse is when gene expression
mechanisms, under the inﬂuence of environmental factors, gen-
erate anatomical structures. Here, gene expression fosters new
functional capabilities for the organism. A biological system
undergoes a traverse also through operations of its organs. A
digestive tract has an important enabling role for the organism.
And so does the immune system, which, with its operations,
realizes new, functionality: a healthier state of the organism. Also,
Darwinian evolution by natural selection can be considered a
traverse when an entire species is considered a system. Evolution
is the lowest-level traverse known in biological systems 7.
In general, a traverse is when more general cybernetic knowl-
edge of monitor-and-act units is used to produce certain beneﬁcial
effects for the system in a form of implementing new, more
speciﬁc cybernetic knowledge. The latter is then considered higher
on the organizational hierarchy than the former.
Thus, creating new structures is equivalent to the system’s adapta-
tion, which is equivalent to extracting cybernetic knowledge, which
can be expressed as a traverse from general to speciﬁc knowledge. A
traverse is the central adaptive act of a practopoietic system.
Traverse is also how a system generates cybernetic variety. A
small number of general rules can be used to extract a large
number of speciﬁc ones. An example is artiﬁcial neural networks8.
The total number of traverses matters. Some systems have a single
traverse (e.g., thermostat, cybernetic feedback loop in Fig. 1A), while
others have more than one traverse (e.g., living systems, neural net-
works; Fig. 2). Importantly, addition of one more traverse provides the
system with much more capability to generate variety—even when the
system is leaner: One systemmay use huge resources to store all actions
Fig. 2. Example systems that exhibit one step more adaptability during self-organization than classical cybernetic systems. (A) The interaction graph of various components
underlying supervised learning in back-propagation and similar algorithms for learning in neural networks. Blue: the top mechanism that implements an input–output
function with the environment. Purple: an adaptive mechanism at a lower level of organization that provides cybernetic knowledge for the top in a form of synaptic weights.
Green: environment from which both mechanisms obtain feedback. (B) Adaptive function of plasticity mechanisms in natural neural networks shown as the relationship of
the speciﬁcity of cybernetic knowledge. There are three levels at which knowledge is stored i.e., three organizational levels, and two types of mechanisms that enable
traverse from general to speciﬁc knowledge: plasticity rules are needed for creating network anatomy, and network anatomy is needed for creation of behavior. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
5 Note that what is considered as the top organization level of a system is
relative and depends on what has been chosen to be considered as a system. For
example, if an organism is considered as an adaptive system, then its top level
corresponds to its behavior and the environment with which it interacts corre-
sponds to the world surrounding the organism. But if a cell within that organism is
the object of the analysis or an organ of an organism, then the top levels
corresponds to the functions of those cells/organs and the environments with
which they interact include other cells and other organs within the organism.
Similarly, a system that transcends a single organism can be the object of the
analysis, such as for example, a humanþmachine system, or a social organization
consisting of multiple human members. In those cases the top levels of organiza-
tion may be different from those of individual organisms and so may be different
the environments with which those systems interact.
6 Hence top level may exert poietic effects possibly only on its environment.
7 Traverse takes place already at the lowest levels of system organization. For
example, the process of evolution by random change and selection is a traverse too:
A general knowledge of evolvability (Kirschner and Gerhart, 1998) is used to extract
a more speciﬁc knowledge about the actual evolved properties of the system (e.g., a
genome). Whether an individual successfully procreates or not is a form of
feedback obtained from the environment, and requires involvement of the top
level of organization i.e., behavior. That way, cybernetic knowledge can be acquired
through evolution and stored in the genome and organelles.
8 For example, an artiﬁcial neural network may implement a large number of
different input–output mapping functions by applying learning rules. The variety
needed to implement learning rules is much smaller in comparision to the total
number of input–output functions that such a system can in principle learn.
Another, even more extreme example is evolution by natural selection whereby
application of a single set of rules—random change combined with natural
selection—produced over long period of time an entire kingdom of living forms
on the planet earth.
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for all situations that could possibly be encountered. Another system
that has an additional traverse may compress that knowledge to a few
general rules and infer in each situation the relevant actions9,10. The
latter one is more adaptive and yet leaner. We can say that each
additional traverse provides a variety relief for the system.
Traverses are crucial for near-decomposability of complex
adaptive systems into components relevant for understanding
how the system works.
2.6. Level-speciﬁc environmental feedback and practopoietic cycle of
causation
In practopoietic systems, interactions need to close the causal
chain of events through the highest level of (self-)organization.
Evolution does not know whether a change is good until a full-
ﬂedged organism is developed to interact with the environment.
This requires involvement at the top of the hierarchy i.e., behavior.
Similarly, genes do not fully know which proteins to synthesize
until the organism interacts with the environment at the highest
level of organization and probes the environment.
Thus, the feedback loop is closed by generating behavior and then
getting feedback on the effects that this behavior exerted. This
follows from the poietic properties of systems: Actions of low-level
mechanism produce effects on higher-level mechanisms, which then
produce effects on the environment (Fig. 1B). In fact, in practopoietic
systems, there is no way around this involvement of the top. If the
causality ﬂowed in any other way, a shortcut would have been found
to affect the environment directly, without the higher levels of
organization. The system would maybe act faster, but would lose
its adaptive capabilities, the degree of loss corresponding to the
number of organization levels skipped due to the shortcut.
Thus, as illustrated in Fig. 1B, upward causation should occur
within the system, and this is a process of poiesis. In contrast,
downward causation should take the path outside the system and
through level-speciﬁc environmental feedback. This is the only way for
the poietic process to receive feedback from the environment, and for
the system as a whole to extract cybernetic knowledge and become a
good regulator. For example, a lack of certain nutrients may cause the
expression of certain genes, which may be in turn responsible for
plastic changes in the nervous system. These changes can then affect
behavior patterns in such a way that the organism successfully
obtains the needed nutrients, which eventually ceases the expression
of the said genes. This entire loop of internal upward poiesis and
external downward feedback through multiple levels of organization
is referred to as the practopoietic cycle (or loop) of causation.
2.7. Equi-level interactions
In any given adaptive system the total number of practopoietic
levels of organization is likely to be smaller than the total number of
monitor-and-act units of that system. For example, so far, we discussed
three possible traverses of knowledge relevant for a nervous system—
based respectively on neural activity, plasticity, and evolution. In
contrast, a nervous system consists of many billions of monitor-and-
act units that take many different physiological forms. Therefore, many
units will not be related hierarchically, but will operate at the same
level of organization and thus, will undergo equi-level interactions11.
Equi-level interactions occur when two ormore components do not
exhibit all the properties required for adaptive practopoietic organiza-
tion: monitor-and-act units, poietic hierarchy and level-speciﬁc feed-
back. There are several scenarios in which two interacting units, A and
B, violate the requirement for practopoietic (self-)organization:
2.7.1. Environmental interactions
Interactions in neither of the two directions (A to B or B to A) occur
directly within the system but instead all interactions occur through
the environment. This occurs when two units lack internal means of
interaction and yet affect the overall behavior of the system. For
example, genes in one skin cell and genes in another neural cell do
not have means to interact directly. Nevertheless, they interact because
each affects somehow the input that the other receives from the
environment: The actions of a neuron may affect behavior, which in
turn affects the amount of sun exposure that the skin cell receives,
which in turn affects its gene expression. Conversely, the color of skin
determined by that cell may affect how the social environment
responds to an individual, which then affects the inputs to that neuron.
Similarly, two neurons may interact chieﬂy through the environment;
A motor neuron in the spinal cord may induce body movements that
change the image projections on the retinae, affecting hence the
activity of the neurons in the visual system. For those cells, monitor-
and-act units from all the levels of organization (i.e., top-1, top-2, etc. in
Fig. 1C; read as “top minus one”, “top minus two”, etc.) may interact
through the environment. This includes plasticity mechanisms of
different cells (e.g., Yoshitake et al., 2013)12.
These interactions through the environment are probably the
most common form of equi-level interactions in biological sys-
tems. Therefore, we can say that adaptive systems are largely
environmentally interactive—i.e., their components interact by
closing the practopoietic cycle of causation.
The top level of organization with its output functions into the
environment is the glue that puts the interactions among all of the
components of the system together. By relying on such indirect
interactions, the system’s knowledge can grow linearly with its physical
size; new monitor-and-act units can be added without having the
burden of implementing the hardware for interaction pathways, the
combinatorics of which grows faster than linearly. The organism’s
interaction with the environment does the “connecting” job.
9 This is similar to the difference between a lookup table (fast access but large
storage resources) and computation on the spot (slower access but a leaner and
more ﬂexible system). Thus, instead of a series of if–then statements, as in an
expert system, an adaptive system relies on general rules applied in each situation
de novo in order to help infer the next action. A key difference to computer
algorithms is that most of the variety in computer software is generated by
traverses executed by the brains of human operators. Intelligent adaptive systems
do not have this external help but have to adjust on their own.
10 Although, it would be possible, in theory, to equip a single-traverse system
with all the necessary knowledge for all the possible events, this works well only
for simple artiﬁcial environments. Under real-life conditions, as are the survival
conditions for a mammal on the planet earth, the combinatorial explosion of the
number of possible situations that the system may encounter is too large.
Consequently, the system has to rely on abstract rules and extraction of knowledge
at multiple levels of organization and thus, on the use of multiple traverses.
11 The number of levels of organization in a system that are prominent and that
play an important role in the system will necessarily be small. There are good
reasons for this: Each level requires excessive resources and extensive knowledge
acquisition. To be inﬂuential, an organization level must possess large cybernetic
variety. There is always a possibility that certain parts of the system organize
themselves into an even large number of levels of organization and thus, form
deeper adaptive structures. However, these parts of the system may rely on small
variety and hence, play a relatively small role in the overall adaptability of the
system. In other words, to near-decompose the system effectively, we are inter-
ested in a small number of organization levels that account for most of the system’s
cybernetic variety.
12 Note that the processing stages of neural networks (such as layers of a
perceptron (Rosenblatt, 1958), or stages of the processing streams in the cortex
(Hubel and Wiesel, 1962) form a hierarchy that is different from that of practo-
poietic systems. The membranes of two neurons may operate poietically at the
same level, although one neuron may be located at a higher brain area than the
other. For example, a cortical neuron is phylogenetically and ontogenetically higher
than a spinal neuron and yet, the inhibition/excitation mechanisms of the two
operate equi-level, while their respective plasticity mechanisms lie at a practo-
poietically lower level, and they both also operate equi-level. Similarly, the
“classical” hierarchy of processing stages in vision: retina4LGN4V14V24…
4 IT is not a poietic hierarchy.
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2.7.2. Bi-directional interactions
Direct physical interactions occur within the system, but in both
directions (from A to B, and from B to A). Hence, in this case no unit
can be identiﬁed as higher or lower on the poietic hierarchy—all units
possess equal level of generality (speciﬁcity) of cybernetic knowledge.
Examples of such interactions are neurons connected into a nervous
system, which exhibit largely reciprocal, reentrant connections (direct
or indirect). Thus, as soon as one neuron attempts to assume higher
generality of cybernetic knowledge by controlling others, the follow-
ing reentrant input controls this neuron in return, and by doing so
restores the generality status of its cybernetic knowledge back to the
same level as the others. (For the requirements to successfully
separate the levels of generality see Section 2.10.)
2.7.3. Feedback-less interactions
Here, direct physical interactions among components only occur
in one direction but there is no feedback from the environment that
would uniquely provide adaptive capabilities to one of the compo-
nents and thus, distinguish it from others. In this scenario, the chain
of causal events within the system is fully determined by the internal
physical properties of that system and the outcome is not controlled
by the properties of the environment. For example, the process that
begins with DNA transcription and ends with a synthesis of a protein
has multiple stages but the environment may not regulate these
stages—once the transcription has started it reliably ends always with
the same protein. Similarly, execution of a simple reﬂex has many
subcomponents (depolarization, action potential generation, neuro-
transmitter release, muscle contraction) but once the events started
unfolding, they may not be any longer adjusted by the feedback from
the environment. In both cases, the monitor-and-act units constitut-
ing the chain of events operate all at the same level of organization.
2.8. Downward pressure for adjustment
Understanding conditions that initiate changes to the system at
the low levels of organization is important for understanding
adaptive practopoietic systems, which is a problem related to the
issue of downward causation (Noble, 2008a, 2008b; Bateson, 2004;
Campbell, 1990; Bedau, 2002). In practopoiesis, effects towards
down occur through level-speciﬁc environmental feedback. The
top level of organization acts on the environment, and then the
environment informs lower levels that the higher ones may not
have performed their jobs successfully. That is, the signal for a need
to act at lower levels is an event that has both of the following
properties: (i) it has been established in the past that this signal
indicates a need for action, and (ii) higher levels did not manage, for
whatever reason, to eliminate that need (i.e., eliminate the signal).
In that case, through level-speciﬁc environmental feedback, the
system experiences a downward pressure for adjustment: Changes are
needed at lower levels of system organization in order to change –
adaptively – the properties of the higher levels. In other words, by
actions of monitor-and-act units laying at the bottom of the hierarchy
a new system with new cybernetic knowledge is created at the top.
For example, various metabolic indicators during a cold season affect
gene expression such that an animal grows thicker fur; or changes in
gene expression due to chronic malnutrition create behavioral
changes that force an animal to change its habitat. A species may
ﬁnd itself under a (downward) pressure to evolve.
As a result of such adaptive capabilities, the total variety of the
system’s interactions with the environment is much higher when
observed across different demands from the environment, than
when the system is observed within relatively stable environ-
mental conditions.
Downward pressure for adjustment always involves the envir-
onment and is often induced by novelties in the environment. In
stable environments, low-level mechanisms experience little pres-
sure for change. Downward pressure for adjustment triggers a
practopoietic cycle of causation and thus, involves actions at the
higher levels of organization. The changes made to higher levels
often cannot be made quickly because there is no direct instruction
on how to ﬁx the problem. Low-level cybernetic knowledge gives
certain strategies on how to approach the problem, but often does
not give a direct solution. In those cases the solution is approached
iteratively: The system must make one change and test the success
of that attempt, and if it was not sufﬁcient it may need to make
another, maybe a different attempt, testing it again and so on13.
Downward pressure is exerted on neuronal plasticity mechanisms
to adjust the anatomy of the system as a result of changes in the
environment (new events). Every form of learning is a result of the
pressure to ﬁx discrepancies between the existing sensory-motor
operations and those required by the surrounding world. The down-
ward pressure is on making more efﬁcient behavioral actions,
percepts, memory recalls, etc. Similarly, evolution by natural selection
can be under more or less pressure for change, when organisms are
more or less adapted to the given environment. In either case, it is
chieﬂy the environment that dictates when changes need to be made.
2.9. Trickle-down information
Another issue related to downward causation is the question of
information traveling in downward direction. A general question is:
How do monitor-and-act units at lower levels of organization obtain
information from environment if information can enter only through
the top level? And if they receive such information, is it based on a
form of downward causation? Examples are various: Learning
mechanisms in neural networks extract feedback from the very same
sensory inputs that drive sensory-motor loops; Gene expression may
be regulated by concentration of molecules, which in turnmay depend
on feeding behavior of the animal.
Practopoiesis presumes a general property of adaptive systems:
While such systems interact with the environment, they necessarily
acquire information about their environment. Consequently, their
internal structure and dynamics already contains information avail-
able to monitor-and-act units operating at various levels of organiza-
tion. This property is called trickle-down information and follows from
the Conant and Ashby’s (1970) good regulator theorem: If the various
components of the system have been adapting the system to the
environment in recent past, the system itself must be informative of
that environment. It is then a question of equipping monitor-and-act
units with a proper cybernetic knowledge to use that information.
Another example of trickle-down information is the mechan-
ical stress produced by the musculoskeletal system, which in turn
evokes physiological responses in the nervous system—process
known as neurodynamics (Shacklock, 1995). In neurodynamics,
high-level mechanisms induce behavior that provides, through
mechanical causal pathways, inputs to low-level physiological
mechanisms. Adaptive functions of these mechanisms have often
13 One consequence of multiple levels of organization is that often an adaptive
system can neither be built quickly nor can it make large adjustments quickly.
Instead, the system must proceed in steps of small changes, each being subjected to
veriﬁcation and further adjustments. Much like the evolution of complex species
can occur only slowly (Darwin, 1859/1998), the growth and learning of a highly
organized organism (or any other adaptive intelligent system) must progress in
small steps. New structures are built gradually on top of the existing ones.
Extensive changes require time. In case that the situation does not allow time for
changes, or the changes cannot be achieved at all, the system can be said to
experience stress. The system makes changes that are not fully optimized and not
enough time is given to reach the best possible balance of all cybernetic knowledge.
Some functionality (i.e., health) is necessarily sacriﬁced. In worst case, the system
may not be successful; an organism dies prematurely, or a species gets extinct.
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valuable effects for the organism as a whole, as observed e.g.
through the beneﬁts of physical exercise for one’s health.
Information that travels practopoietically downwards must be
based on physical interactions and thus, on causal events. Importantly,
however, this causation is not poietic. The information that arrives
down only produces pressure for adjustment. In other words, these
downward-headed physical events only serve as triggers for activating
(or deactivating) poietic processes executed by monitor-and-act units.
These poietic actions then only exert effects towards up. These non-
poietic trickle-down causal effects may be considered as “side-effects”
exerted towards down while high-levels units execute their poietic
functions toward up. Low-level units learn to take advantage of these
side effects. One reason that poietic effects cannot occur towards down
is the need to shield cybernetic knowledge.
2.10. Knowledge shielding
From transcendence of knowledge (i.e., from inductive bias)
follows a need to ensure resilience of knowledge at lower levels of
organization to events that occur at higher levels of organization. The
short-lived speciﬁc pieces of cybernetic knowledge supersede each
other with high pace. They should not spoil the general knowledge
acquired through much longer periods of time and reﬂecting much
more “wisdom”. For example, the current extreme temperature to
which a thermostat may be exposed should not affect the general
input–output functions of the thermostat; A temporary event of a
low air temperature should not immediately cause the animal to
change its genome into growing a thick fur. A search for a shelter
may be a much more appropriate response.
In other words, the general knowledge at lower levels of organiza-
tion should be protected, or shielded, from the whims of the speciﬁc
events at higher levels of organization. The uni-directional ﬂow of
poiesis in adaptive systems serves exactly this purpose: This organiza-
tion ensures that general knowledge makes decisions about speciﬁc
knowledge, but not the other way around; The “big picture” must not
be muddled by the current affairs. This separation of knowledge is the
key to success of an adaptive system.
If knowledge shielding would be suddenly lost and the current
events at the high levels of organization would readily change, the
knowledge at lower levels of organization – e.g., if the behavior of an
animal could change animal’s genes – the adaptive capabilities of the
system would quickly fall apart. The system would not be able to
adapt any longer—or even survive. The general knowledge in our
genes, acquired through eons, would quickly water down by the
current events. The organism would be adapted only to very speciﬁc
most-recent circumstances, and would lose the knowledge needed to
the deal with a variety of circumstances, which the ancestors have
painstakingly acquired through a long process of natural selection.
Cybernetic wisdom would be replaced by folly.
Similarly, if knowledge shielding was suddenly lost within a
nervous system, memories and skills acquired throughout lifetime
could vanish in a wake of a single novel event: One may forget
how to walk while one swims.
The historical debate between Charles Darwin’s natural selection and
Jean Lamarck’s acquired characteristics was in fact a debate of whether
inherited information is shielded. Darwin’s theory presumed knowledge
shielding whereas Lamarck’s presumed the opposite—a system without
a practopoietic hierarchy, in which a single giraffe could extend its neck
by interacting with unusually high trees and then transfer this new
knowledge to its ancestors. By now, much evidence has been accumu-
lated to indicate that largely Darwinwas right and that Lamarckian type
of inheritance plays a very small role, if any. Practopoiesis explains why
this has to be the case: Lamarckian approachwould be disastrous for the
knowledge acquired by distant ancestors. If just one or few generations
experienced absence of a certain food source or a certain predator, the
knowledge on how to ﬁnd, consume and digest that food, or how to
recognize, avoid and ﬁght that predatormaywash out, having disastrous
effects on the species as a whole.
Physiological mechanisms by which living cells shield genetic
knowledge are epitomized in Crick’s (1958, 1970) central dogma of
molecular biology: Information can be transferred from DNA to proteins
but not the other way around. Currently, much less is known about the
mechanisms that shield memories within the nervous system.
2.11. Intelligence: Traverses combined with variety
A factor that enhances the adaptability of a system is addition of a
traverse. To analyze the possible limitations of the current brain theory
and artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) algorithms, and to determine whether
they can be improved by addition of a traverse, it is necessary to
establish what additional traverses bring to the overall system’s
intelligence. We have made a case that adding a level of organization
gives more adaptive advantages to a system. For example, adding
organization levels at the bottom of the hierarchy, in form of evolution,
can be useful. But adding organizational levels in the middle of the
hierarchy can help adaptability too. A system that evolves an inter-
mediate adaptive stage is more adaptive than a system lacking that
stage. For example, genes do not act directly on the environment but
create nervous system, which then acts. Here, the nervous system
plays a role of an intermediate adaptive stage. In addition, a network
equipped with plasticity rules is more adaptive then the network
without plasticity rules. Also, plasticity rules may be adjusted and
produce even a more adaptive system14.
Intermediate adaptive stages provide the space needed to adjust
system’s own properties i.e., to learn. A system that is powerful in
acting on the environment but is unable to act on “itself” is much
less adaptive than a system that is able to change its own structure.
Practopoietic theory emphasizes the importance of each additional
traverse of a system. The more organizational levels spanned by
traverses, the better the coverage of the generality-speciﬁcity continuum
of cybernetic knowledge. Thus, a system may possess a large amount of
knowledge, but yet may not be very adaptable, much like a book may
contain much information and still be unable to exhibit intelligence and
rewrite itself because it has no traverses. In contrast, a thermostat has
one traverse and although it deals with only one variable at a time (it has
low variety), in terms of practopoiesis, it is more adaptive than a book. A
thermostat, with its traverse, has one more form of interaction with the
environment than a book. Similarly, a computer may store and process
more information than the genome of the simplest bacteria (gigabytes as
opposed to 1.3 megabytes of Pelagibacter ubique; Giovannoni et al.,
2005) and yet, due to its multiple traverses, a bacterium is a system of a
higher degree of adaptability than a computer.
Despite this increase in adaptive levels in biological systems,
their total adaptive power i.e., their intelligence, is given by a
combination of the number of traverses and the total cybernetic
variety possessed by the system. The systems that posses the
same number of traverses are set apart by the amount of
cybernetic knowledge. Additional knowledge can increase rich-
ness of behavior too. For example, a Braintenberg (1984) vehicle
consisting of two controllers and can produce much richer
dynamics than a single controller of a thermostat, and hence
may exhibit higher intelligence. And the larger human genome
can produce more than the small genome of bacterium Pelagi-
bacter ubique (750 MB vs. 1.3 MB). Similarly, a human brain
14 An additional organization level may be provided below plasticity by the so-
called phenomenon of metaplasticity, or plasticity-of-plasticity (e.g., Abraham and
Bear, 1996). However, currently it is not known whether these mechanisms involve
level-speciﬁc environmental feedback at all the levels of organization (i.e., at all
levels of plasticity), which would be required in order to qualify as a multi-level
practopoietic system.
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can produce richer behavior than a mouse brain due to the
variety produced by the total number of cells15.
Nevertheless, the number of traverses makes a crucial difference
for how a system can generate variety. With loss of each traverse
more variety must be pre-stored, and the future needs already need
to be known at the time of storage. In contrast, with an additional
traverse, the variety can be generated and adjusted as events unfold.
The process of extraction of cybernetic knowledge ensures that the
organism continues to be a good model of its environment. Hence,
systems with a larger number of traverses can be smaller in total size
and yet, produce the same or higher amount of variety than systems
with a smaller number of traverses. This has critical consequences for
operations in environments unpredictable at a certain shorter time-
scale—those who’s recent past is not necessarily a good predictor of
immediate future. The less predictable the surrounding world at
short time scales is i.e., the more the long-term statistics needs to be
considered, the higher the advantage of an additional traverse. An
additional traverse may enable the system to adjust more efﬁciently
to new circumstances in the surrounding world.
This brings us to a realization that all cybernetic knowledge
must have a source, i.e. a level below that has extracted it.
Knowledge of biological systems can be tracked down to Darwin’s
evolution by natural selection i.e., to the most fundamental piece
of knowledge of all: It is good for the species to make small
changes by chance. The knowledge of machines can be tracked
down to human engineers—i.e., machines are extensions of the
humans who create them and lie thus at the practopoietically
higher levels of organization (e.g., topþ1). It took billions of years
of biological evolution to create bimetal and arrange it into a
thermostat. Thus, the fundaments of the cybernetic knowledge of
machines can also be tracked down to biological evolution.
Adaptively more advanced machines i.e., more intelligent machines,
should be able to extract their own cybernetic knowledge in high
proportion and thus, reduce the role of humans. For example, a
thermostat with an additional traverse at the bottom of the hierarchy
should be able to extract its own knowledge on how to keep a space
comfortably warm. A robot should determine its own behavioral
actions to achieve its goals.
3. Characterizing systems of different adaptability levels
The central idea of practopoietic theory is that, depending on the
number of traverses, there are limitations on how much a system can
adapt even if the variety of the system is unlimited. Here we system-
atically characterize systems of different numbers of traverses, which
are labeled as Tn, where n indicates that number. Themost important is
the difference in the maximum adaptive capabilities exhibited by
systems that have two traverses, as presumed by the current brain
theories, in comparison to those that have three traverses and thus,
exhibit additional adaptive competencies.
3.1. A T0-system: Information and structure
A T0-system does not have practopoietically operational cap-
abilities. It exhibits zero traverses and has only one level of (self-)
organization. A T0-system is a part or a structural component of a
larger system. A T0-system can be adapted, but it does not perform
any adaptation itself.
Any structural element of a system e.g., a bone in a body is a T0-
system, and so is any passive form of information storage, such as a
book or DNA. Any tool or instrument, such as a knife, has a maximum
of T0-capabilities too. Also, active components e.g., a motor or a
computation processor, have T0-capabilities if they are not closing a
loop with the environment to which the system adapts.
Fig. 3. Creation (poiesis) of a functional reﬂex arc in a two-traversal system by applying hypothetical plasticity rules that rely on level-speciﬁc environmental feedback. (A) The plasticity
rule to keep or strengthen connections: A contingency is sought inwhich an input produces output and is quickly followed by a removal of the input. This is taken as an indicator that a
neuron’s actions remove the transpiring inputs, which is in turn an indicator of a good performance of the reﬂex. (B) The plasticity rule to dispose connections and seek new ones: The
output of a neuron is not followed by a removal of the input. (C) A hypothetical sequence of events in the process of poiesis of a monitor-and-act unit at a higher level of organization
(reﬂex) by the actions at a lower level of organization (plasticity rules): (i) At ﬁrst, there is no detectable contingency between input and output. (ii) This prompts the neuron to abandon
existing synapses and to seek new ones. A new one may produce contingencies but not necessarily a desirable one (e.g., forming a positive rather than a negative feedback loop). (iii) A
further search for a synapse ﬁnally results in a desirable negative feedback loop, and is kept and maintained.
15 Note that the total count of cells alone is not sufﬁcient to produce all the
necessary variety. The cells need to be equipped also with the correct cybernetic
knowledge. The content of that knowledge is crucial in determining the total
intelligence of the system. This is because systems may differ in how good models
of the surrounding world they are. This is why a human, although equipped with a
smaller brain than e.g. a whale, can exhibit in many aspects more intelligent
behavior than a whale.
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T0-systems are relevant for practopoiesis as constitutive com-
ponents of larger, more adaptive systems. They provide support
such as structure or information that is utilized within the system.
Hence, not any object or computation can be labeled T0. To be
granted the title, a component must be a functional part of an
adaptive system and thus, must already have undergone certain
steps of practopoietic organization and knowledge extraction.
3.2. A T1-system: Control and deduction
A T1-system exhibits one traverse and therefore, involves operations
across two levels of organization. This system exhibits minimal
adaptive capabilities. Its physical structure enables receiving inputs
from the environment and sending outputs.
The cybernetic knowledge of that system may be austere, as in the
case of a simple thermostat, or rich as e.g., stored within the
connectivity pattern of a large neural network wired-up to input–
output devices enabling interactions with an environment. T1-systems
can close a loop with the environment in a continuous manner or in a
discrete one i.e., acting only when speciﬁc conditions are met, for
example when a threshold is reached. Hence, in its simplest form, a T1-
system can be described as a controlmechanism, or as a regulator. Also,
a variety rich T1-system can be seen as an elaborate monitor-and-act
machine—a device that responds to events in the environment.
A T1-system can also be understood as a mechanism that
extracts knowledge. More formally they can be said to implement
deduction of cybernetic knowledge: The action for a speciﬁc case is
deduced (at higher level of organization) from a general rule (at
lower level of organization).
In biology, subsystems of an organism can be described as T1 when
they perform homeostatic functions (Cannon, 1932). For example,
negative feedback loops for controlling body temperature are T1-
systems. The same is the case for the mechanism for regulating blood
glucose levels (Ahima and Flier, 2000). Reﬂexes e.g., a stretch reﬂex
(Liddell and Sherrington, 1924; Gurﬁnkel et al., 1974), can also be
described as having a single traverse. The rate of gene-expression,
which is regulated by a feedback loop, is a T1-system. For example, the
excess of tryptophan directly prevents further synthesis of that amino
acid (Gollnick et al., 2005). T1-systems are not limited to negative
feedback but can implement positive-feedback loops too16. Human-
made devices can be described, in general, as being limited to T1-
capabilities17,18.
The main limitation of T1-systems is excessive variety that would
be required to deal with real-life problems. Although such systems can
implement in principle any mapping function, in real life this is not
enough because the number of combinations of events that an animal
or a person could possibly encounter in his/her life in all possible
environments that it may live in and in all possible situations that it
may encounter, is way too large to be stored in a T1 physical system19.
Instead, more ﬂexibility is needed to learn selectively only about those
environments in which the organisms actually happen to live.
3.3. A T2-system: Supervision and induction
A T2-system consists of two traverses and provides as much a
whole new class of ﬂexibility compared to T1, as T1 adds to
adaptability in comparison to a T0-system. A T2-system can be
understood as granting supervision to a T1-system in the form of
machinery that monitors the effects that T1 produces on the
environment and that has the cybernetic knowledge to adjust
the T1 component whenever necessary. The need for adjustment
may appear e.g., when properties of the environment change.
A T2-system operates across a total of three levels of organiza-
tion, the lower traverse relying on the most general form of
cybernetic knowledge (the rules of supervision) and extracting
knowledge of medium generality (the supervised properties of the
system) and then, the higher traverse relying on that knowledge to
extract an even more speciﬁc form of knowledge (the actual
interaction with the surrounding world). Thus, a T2-system can
cover more area of the generality-speciﬁcity continuum than T1
can (Figs. 2B vs. 1C-left).
The additional adaptive capabilities of a T2-system stem from
the properties of its middle level of organization. While the
cybernetic knowledge at the bottom of the hierarchy is always
ﬁxed and the one on the top of the hierarchy changes perpetually
with even the slightest change in the environment, the middle
level in a T2-system provides a place to store temporary knowl-
edge that may be valid for a while, but which may be changed later
if circumstances require so. A T2-system is the ﬁrst one that is able
to learn on its own to control the environment. In other words,
while a T1-system controls only the surrounding world, a T2-
system controls also itself. Thus, a T2-system can be understood as
being capable of inducing cybernetic knowledge. It learns how to
monitor and act. The process underlying the lower traverse
induces the rules that drive the deductions of the higher traverse.
For example, a T2-system equipped with a thermometer, a heating
pad, a few other components and appropriate learning rules may
be able to invent a thermostat and by doing so, extract cybernetic
knowledge on how to maintain the environmental temperature
constant. In that example, the invention process is the supervisor
of the thermostat.
16 Mechanisms responsible for a positive feedback loop can be equally so
considered as T1. For example, mechanisms that evoke emotions may evoke
behavior that further intensify the same emotions, acting thus in a positive
feedback loop (Thayer and Lane, 2000). In those cases monitor-and-act components
make a certain response progressively step-up and these increases may be of equal
importance for the survival of an organism as negative feedback-based homeostatic
regulations.
17 Devices that we build are set to interact with the environment by producing
a single traverse—often, a part of the interaction is a human operator/user. For
example, a TV-set is made to interact with its human environment as to get inputs
(through button presses) and to deliver outputs (sound, picture). With very few
exceptions, our technology improves through an increase in cybernetic variety, not
through an increase in the degree of adaptability. That is, the machinery is not
being added new traverses. Rather, the number of different responses across
different situations is increased. New circuitry is added by human engineers, not
by a system that would ﬁnd ways to improve by itself. Hence, von Neumann
computer architecture is used almost exclusively as a high-variety but not a high-
adaptability system—keeping its operations mostly at the T1-level.
18 While in the pre-industrial era T0-artifacts dominated the human civilization
in forms of various energy-passive objects such as tools, books, houses, and cold
weapons, the industrial and information era brought extensive use of energy-
consuming devices and thus, proliferation of T1-systems. Any other adaptive needs
that exceed T1 rely mostly on human operators, whose minds operate with more
traverses.
Similarly, our formal mathematical tools for scientiﬁc and engineering descrip-
tions are mostly suitable for describing operations of T1-systems. We use an
equation to make inferences and decisions, the application of which is often a T1-
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system. The system describes a traverse from a general rule speciﬁed by the
equation to the speciﬁcs of input and output values. By that token a hand-held
calculator is a T1-system, and equally so is a complex calculation implemented in a
spreadsheet software. In general, a formal logical system with premises and
conclusions is a T1-system, whereby a single traverse sufﬁces to derive a conclusion
from the premises. Whereas the discipline of mathematics requires much more
than T1 for creative formulation of problems and insights on possible solutions, in
the end, solutions and proofs are reduced down to a set of T1 operations. Whenever
the human mind operates logically, its high-level adaptive capabilities are reduced
to much less adaptive (but usually more reliable) T1-operations.
19 This number could easily exceed the number of atoms in the universe.
Hence, it is not possible to device a physical storage or the needed information, not
to mention the impossibility of conceiving a mechanisms by which this knowledge
would be acquired. For example, there would be not enough time in the age of the
universe to acquire such knowledge by a process of evolution by natural selection.
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In biology, many examples of T2-supervision can be found.
Gene expression mechanisms play the ultimate supervisory role
within an organism. The homeostatic function that any organ
performs, or the regulation machinery responsible for a reﬂex, or
the feedback loop involved in the response of the immune system
—all need to be supervised. Someone has to make sure that they
work properly, and make adjustment when necessary. In biological
systems, this supervisory role can be traced back to gene expres-
sion mechanisms.
Therefore, to keep one variable constant in an unpredictable
world, the control mechanism for that variable has to adjust,
which means changing some other variables in the system by
operations performed by the supervisory systems. In other words,
in T2-systems, lower-level traverses have the capability of inducing
allostasis (Sterling and Eyer, 1988; Sterling, 2004; Karatsoreos and
McEwen, 2011): maintaining constancy at one place in the system
by making the necessary changes at another place in the system.
For example, in a case of dehydration, extensive physiological
changes are needed in order to maintain the most critical internal
water concentrations in the working range. Urine output is
reduced. Veins and the arteries are constricted to maintain blood
pressure with less ﬂuid. The tongue and the mouth dry up.
Whereas a minimum of T1-adaptability is needed for Bernard’s
(1974) milieu intérieur and homeostasis (Cannon, 1932), a mini-
mum of T2-adaptive capacities is needed for a system to be able to
perform allostasis (Sterling and Eyer, 1988; Sterling, 2004;
Karatsoreos and McEwen, 2011). Thus, although allostatic systems
are built solely from homeostatic mechanisms (Day, 2005), allos-
tasis reﬂects an increased level of system organization (i.e., T2 is
build from T1-components).
3.3.1. Neural networks and T2
Supervision i.e., knowledge induction, is also important for
organizing neural networks. In the nervous system, plasticity
mechanisms play the supervisory role for establishing the anatomy
of the system, which in turn determines how the sensory-motor
loops operate. Plasticity mechanisms mediate growth of axons and
dendrites, formation of synapses and neuronal excitability.
Activity-dependent plasticity is responsible for the development
of a nervous system and for its maintenance later (Dubner and Ruda,
1992; Ganguly and Poo, 2013). A minimum of T2-structure is needed
to allostatically change the anatomy (synaptic weights in the mildest
form) in order to maintain behavioral functionality of the system as a
whole. A recovery after an injury, such as a stroke, also could not
occur without a T2-structure and thus, without feedback obtained
through exercise. Failure to successfully function at the higher
traverse i.e., at the sensory-motor functions of the neural network,
induces downward pressure for adjustment by actions of the lower
traverse.
While some of the lower-traverse plasticity mechanisms may
simply be keeping a neuron within its optimal operational range,
such as the up-regulation of excitability following a period of
quiescence (Mozzachiodi and Byrne, 2010; Hansel et al., 2001;
Turrigiano, 2012), others may have a more general adaptive
function related to the neuron’s role in goal-oriented behavior
(Buonomano and Merzenich, 1998; Draganski et al., 2004; Xu
et al., 2009). For example, the reward systems based on dopamine
signaling (Wise, 1996) can inform a cell whether to make changes
in order to produce a more adaptive form of behavior in the future
(note that Hebbian learning alone is generally not sufﬁcient to
provide an additional traverse20).
The higher traverse of a neural system involves de- and hyperpo-
larization of neural membranes, generation and delivery of action
potentials, and synaptic transmission. Here, cybernetic knowledge
created by the plasticity mechanisms and stored at the level of
anatomical properties of a neuron is used to extract more speciﬁc
knowledge in the form of the current activity of that neuron. This
highest level of organization involves both physiological and beha-
vioral phenomena. Physiological phenomena at that top level are
ﬁring rates, inhibition, excitation, neural synchrony, oscillatory activ-
ity, etc. Behavioral phenomena are manifested as simple reﬂexes but
also as more elaborated forms of closed sensory-motor loops—such
as the willful conscious behavior.
An example of a T2-system that establishes proper connectivity
in a network is illustrated in Fig. 3. To obtain feedback from the
environment at its lowest level of organization, a neuron may
monitor the efﬁciency of its outputs in controlling its own inputs.
The presumed rule strengthens connections if the output of a
neuron has the power to mute its inputs (Fig. 3A) and weakens
connections otherwise (Fig. 3B). In the most extreme case, the
neuron may completely remove a connection deﬁned as un-
functional by those rules and seek to create a new one (Fig. 3C).
These rules grant adaptive capabilities to the system. The rule may
be used to establish the network connectivity at ﬁrst but can also
be used later if the environment changes those relationships and
the neuron’s connectivity needs to be adjusted again. This grants
considerable adaptive capabilities to the system. For example, if a
reﬂex is not working efﬁciently due to muscle fatigue, such a rule
can be used to crank up the efﬁciency of a synapse involved in that
reﬂex—resulting in an improved overall functionality21. In man-
made devices, T2 allostatic systems are rare and rudimentary22.
20 The so-called Hebbian learning mechanisms (Hebb, 2002), are not likely to
contribute alone considerably the adaptability levels of the system i.e., to the
anapoiesis. There are two possible limitations. First, the type of information that
(footnote continued)
they consider is not highly sensitive to environmental inﬂuences. For example,
spike-timing dependent plasticity (Bi and Poo, 1998), which is a form of Hebbian
learning, detects the timing relationships between pre- and post spike-synaptic
spike. It is unlikely that this timing provides information about the properties of
the environment (Turrigiano and Nelson, 2004). Hence, Hebbian learning is not
designed for closure of practopoietic cycle of cautions with the external events. The
second limitation of Hebbian mechanisms is that it is not clear whether they are
capable of altering their properties if the circumstances in the environment require
so. For example, if the environment’s properties change, thus invalidating the
application of Hebbian rules (e.g., maybe now the organism would do better by
applying anti-Hebbian learning instead), there is no way for the system to adjust to
that change in the environment.
The primary beneﬁt that Hebbian learning mechanisms provide is variety; A
system with a Hebbian learning mechanism can produce a larger variety of
behaviors than the same system lacking such a learning mechanism. A network
that forms a T1-system with an addition of a non-adaptive learning mechanism
remains a T1-system. Learning rules other than Hebbian may be more suited for
achieving adaptability of the system. For example, a hypothetical mechanism based
on timing relations between input and output spikes described in Fig. 3 is in a
better position to use feedback from environmental than is Hebbian learning.
21 For example, a learning rule (top-2) such as the one in Fig. 3 may be
implemented to detect that operations are suboptimal, which then results in
changes made at the level of anatomy (top-1). These changes in turn affect how
behavior is produced (top) in order to satisfy the needs of the organism. Thus, an
allostatic change at one level (e.g., network anatomy) keeps another variable
constant (e.g., supply of nutrition to the organism).
22 In human-made machinery, implementations of T2-systems exist but are
rare and almost exclusively limited to control based on a single variable. Thus, at
the level of supervision, these T2-systems exhibit a minimum of cybernetic variety.
Examples include various servomechanisms—e.g., temperature (car engine, com-
puter processor), speed (cruise control) or angular position (robotic arm). These
mechanisms usually ensure proper functioning of another process that itself closes
a loop with the environment and can be described as T1 (the operations of the car,
computer, robot), making it in total a T2-system. To the best of the author’s
knowledge, no variety-rich engineered T2-system exists. That is, no artiﬁcial system
with two traverses contains extensive cybernetic knowledge at the lower traverse.
Another example of high-hierarchy but relatively low-variety interaction systems
may be management hierarchies in social organizations, in which usually only a
few instructions are given by the person in charge as a supervisor, and by the
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T2-structure helps a system operating in a changing, environ-
ment unpredictable at fast time scales in which no preconceived
plans can be executed without an occasional need for adjustments
to new circumstances, and no rules of behavior can be applied for
long time without the need for adapting them according to the
altered properties of the world. There is a need for general
knowledge on how to adjust in a given situation. The system
monitors indicators of successes/failures of the executed actions
and modiﬁes its own properties according to more general knowl-
edge of which adjustments should be made, and how.
The limitation of a T2-system is that it can learn efﬁciently to
deal with only one set of behaving rules at the time i.e., with one
type of situation. If the system learns to behave in one situation, it
has hard time behaving in another situation without extensive
relearning thus, ﬁnding itself in a need to forget the old knowledge
in order to acquire new knowledge. This transition from situation
to situation is related to stability plasticity dilemma23 and is costly
both in learning time and in the adaptability that the system can
exhibit.
3.4. A T3-system: Anapoiesis and abduction—The mind
To the same degree to which T1 has more adaptability than T0,
or T2 than T1, a T3-system has a qualitatively higher level of
adaptability than a T2-system. This system can be seen as a higher-
order supervisor—or supervision of a supervisor, which, when
combined with high variety, gives it unique adaptive capabilities.
The adaptive advantages of a T3-system stem from its expanded
capabilities for acquisition of cybernetic knowledge at two differ-
ent levels of generality. A T3–system has in total four levels of
organization, which can be referred to as top-3, top-2, top-1 and
top. This provides the system with two levels of organization at
which it can change its own structure (top-1 and top-2) i.e., at
which it can learn (Fig. 4).
The most obvious advantage is more detailed coverage of the
generality-speciﬁcity continuum of knowledge about the sur-
rounding world. However, there is a qualitative leap in the
adaptability that comes from this additional traverse when variety
is high at each level of organization. The system can juggle much
knowledge internally from a general to a speciﬁc level and back:
With a minimal hint from the environment on what is about to
come, a previously acquired knowledge about the upcoming
activities can be pulled out from the general level and poietically
instilled at a more speciﬁc level.
As a consequence, a T3-system is not only capable of learning
how to control but it can also learn how to learn quickly. The
mentioned slow adaptation process may turn into a process as
quick as what it takes to recognize a pattern. This is made possible
by the intermediate traverse out of the total of three traverses that
the system possesses (Fig. 4A). This is the traverse in a sandwich i.
e., it is the one whose both ends meet other traverses: Its lower-
end knowledge is not ﬁxed but can be changed; Its higher end-
knowledge is not an output but is still a part of the system. The
consequence is that this middle traverse can give the system
unprecedented level of adaptability, which, with sufﬁcient variety,
leads to nothing short of the ability to think.
The middle traverse can be understood as reconstructing
knowledge at top-1 that has been extracted once but lost since.
In T3-systems, the knowledge at top-1 can be treated as tempor-
ary, while more permanent version is stored at top-2, which has
also a more general (abstract) form. This generalized knowledge
is stored by the learning rules at top-3 (Fig. 4B). Then, when
needed, top-1 knowledge can be reconstructed from top-2 by a
relatively brief interaction with the environment. Ultimately, it is
top-1 that controls behavior directly (top is the actual behavior).
It is the level of organization that embraces all of the following:
the current position of limbs, the current tension in muscles, and
the current depolarization of neural membranes. And it is top-1
that determines how the depolarization of membranes will
change next and thus, how will the tension in muscles and limb
positions change too. However, it is the general knowledge at
top-2 that does the control in the background because cybernetic
knowledge at that level enables ﬂexible exchange of the contents
at top-1. Thus, with each alteration in the general properties of
the environment, the system may not need to relearn everything
from scratch and extract cybernetic knowledge from the envir-
onment again, as a T2-system would need to do. Instead, given
that the traces of previous encounters with similar situations
have been stored at two levels below, the knowledge can be
brought back up now quickly24.
That way, a familiar situation i.e., a set of environmental properties,
needs to be detected to initiate reconstruction, but the details
associated with that situation need not be learned all over again. Many
of the details are already pre-stored and can be easily “pulled out” from
a general form to a more speciﬁc one suitable for a given situation or
context. Thus, a T3-system can also be understood as implementing
situation-dependent or context-dependent supervision.
This reconstructive traverse from top-2 to top-1 organization
level is referred to as anapoiesis, from Ancient Greek ανά (ana)
meaning “over, again”. The term refers to the repeated creation of
knowledge through reconstruction from a general depository to a
more speciﬁc form.
Anapoiesis is an additional intermediate generator of variety at
top-1. It is triggered whenever the environment signiﬁcantly
changes and downward pressure for adjustment is exerted onto
the monitor-and-act units at the level top-2. If no signiﬁcant
pressure has been exerted at top-3 and if the system eventually
succeeds in removing the adjustment pressure by relying on top-2/
top-1 only, then a relatively easy solution to the problem has been
reached. The system has successfully reconstructed knowledge
from its past experiences and used anapoietic reconstruction to
guide its behavior in a given situation.
In contrast, if the downward pressure for adjustment reaches
all the way to the bottom and thus, the monitor-and-act units at
the level top-3 are informed of a need to make changes, anapoiesis
alone has likely not been sufﬁcient to satisfy the needs of the
system. A new, unfamiliar situation is encountered! In that case, a
T3-system adapts by deploying its unique capability to make
changes to the general knowledge that drives anapoiesis—creating
new knowledge at the level top-2 for a new type of situation. Thus,
the full dynamics of the practopoietic cycle of causation in a T3-
system includes anapoiesis as the middle traverse (from organiza-
tion level top-2 to top-1) but also the veriﬁcation process, which
necessarily engages the top traverse (from top-1 to top), and the
adjustment of the general knowledge (from top to top-2), which is(footnote continued)
supervisor of a supervisor, and so on (note the reversal of practopoietic and
decision-power hierarchies, note 4).
23 One commonly encountered problem in pattern recognition is the so-called
stability-plasticity dilemma (Grossberg, 1987), also known as catastrophic interfer-
ence (McCloskey and Cohen, 1989; Ratcliff, 1990). As T1/T2-networks learn new
datasets, they forget the old ones. The level top-1 forgets what it has known earlier.
For T2-systems, to acquire two different types of responses for two different
datasets, their samples need to be intermixed, avoiding any temporal grouping—a
requirement in discord with the real life.
24 To reconstruct that knowledge at the top-1 level of organization and to use it
for controlling behavior, the system still needs to interact with the environment,
but this time in a more efﬁcient way. The system may initiate a poietic process from
a simple hint from the environment and then seek level-speciﬁc environmental
feedback about the efﬁciency of its reconstructive operations again from a
relatively modest and quickly accessible environmental sources.
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engaged whenever anapoiesis fails. This describes the full global
workspace (Baars, 2005) of a T3-system.
In artiﬁcial neural networks, anapoiesis may provide a general
solution to the problem of the stability-plasticity dilemma, as it
enables dealing with both general and speciﬁc knowledge25. But
anapoiesis needs not only underpin cognitive-like operations. An
example of it is the creation of phenotype from genotype26 . Here,
one has to note that if individuals are T3-systems, an entire
evolving species of such individuals forms a T4-system. Systems
bigger than T4 do not seem to be necessary for survival on the
planet earth27 .
Fig. 4. A tri-traversal system obtained by inserting a traverse in-between plasticity and neural activity. Such a system implements anapoiesis as a middle traverse that lies
between plastic changes creating anatomy and neural activity creating behavior. Anapoiesis extracts knowledge about the current situation and may be the missing component
needed to account for human cognition. (A) An interaction graph indicating that anapoiesis needs its own feedback from environment in order to grasp the current situation.
The time scales indicate that situation grasping is mostly a quicker process than extraction of network anatomy, but also a slower process than the sensory-motor loops of neural
activity needed to generate behavior. (B) The four levels of organization and the corresponding three traverses shows in a knowledge graph. Knowledge extracted by anapoiesis
is more speciﬁc than the knowledge stored in the anatomy (ideatheca) of the system, but is more general than that extracted by neural activity.
25 A T2-system i.e., a system without anapoiesis, cannot adjust to new proper-
ties of the environment – an equivalent of a new situation –without forgetting how
it had adjusted to the previous properties of the environment. To be able to enter a
new dataset abruptly and to adjust top-1 accordingly at a momentary notice, an
elaborate top-2 must be developed. Hence, a T3-system exhibiting anapoiesis may
be required.
26 The development of an organism is an anapoietic process. The process of
evolution can be considered as a traverse—i.e., the lowest traverse of a species-
individual system. If the individual has at least an adaptability level of T2, the
species as a whole, including its evolution, exhibits the adaptive level of T3 (and if
the organism is T3, as argued later in the text, the species as a whole would be T4).
This means then that the traverse from genes to the anatomy of the system exhibits
anapoiesis. For example, the growth of an oak tree is an anapoietic process from
general knowledge on how to build an oak tree stored in genes to the actual
instantiation of the oak. This re-construction process involves interaction with the
environment and thus, the actual outcome is somewhat different in each instance,
depending on the properties of the environment. For example, to maximize the
amount of exposure to sunlight, shapes of branches and orientations of leafs may
vary depending on the given situation. The same holds for the growth of other
organisms. The anapoiesis of the organism depends on the environment. For
example, the animal’s fur may grow thicker in colder environment, or the liver can
grow larger for a certain diet (Fris, 2004).
Anapoiesis is responsible for different phenotypes given the same genotype.
Phenotype does not come from a pre-determined plan in genes. Genes create
structure through feedback processes and regulation. Thus, the amounts of various
created structures depend largely on the properties of the environment. In identical
environments, identical phenotype would be obtained for the same genotype, but
when properties of the environment vary, as in the real life, also phenotypes
necessarily vary. Perhaps the most sensitive aspect of our anatomy to environ-
mental factors, the one that is made to be susceptible as much as possible, are the
anatomical structures that store our long-term memories. Everything that we learn
is in effect a phenotype of the learning rules stored in the genotype.
Hence, also anapoiesis is the schooling-based transfer of knowledge from one
(footnote continued)
generation to the next. Parents can educate their offspring by conveying knowledge
not transferable through genes. This may include learning how to open a nut, hunt,
use language, or appreciate music. This knowledge, provided during upbringing, is
necessarily stored at higher levels of system organization than genes. Our culture is
essentially anapoietic—it has to be re-created in every new individual. It is a form of
phenotype (or extended phenotype; Dawkins, 1999, 2004). Anapoiesis makes it
possible to skip the tedious process of rediscovering knowledge from scratch.
Instead, a poiesis of speciﬁc knowledge is propelled by combining the inborn
general cybernetic knowledge with a stimulating environment provided by the
environment.
27 One question is how far can the hierarchy of adaptability go and thus, can T5
or larger systems exist? At present, no evidence for use of such larger systems to
any signiﬁcant extent seems to exist. For a T5-system we should ﬁnd an additional
organizational levels in either of the two directions, one that is more fundamental
than the mechanisms of Darwinian evolution, or one that lies organizationally
above our behavioral actions.
A putative mechanism that controls evolution would be much slower than the
process of evolution itself and would exert control on how evolution is executed.
For as far as the author’s knowledge of biology reaches, there seems no evidence to
exist that the process of natural evolution is controlled by another mechanism that
possesses even more general cybernetic knowledge. However, this does not mean
that one should not keep one eye open towards this possibility.
A T5-system created by adding another level of organization on top of the
existing biological hierarchy would have to involve some form of development of
technology. In that case, our behavioral acts would create machines and these
machines would then act on the environment. However, most of our technology
cannot be considered as representing another level of practopoietic organization
because our interactions with the environment do not exclusively depend on these
machines. We usually use machines in parallel with direct behavioral actions.
Therefore, interactions machines–humans are mostly equi-level. Nevertheless, it is
not difﬁcult to create a scenario, e.g. an underwater robot, whereby in principle,
and for a limited environment and a limited period of time, the interactions
completely depend on the monitor-and-act units in form of machines created by
humans. Thus, for this limited case it could be said that the combined system
humanþrobot has practopoietic hierarchy larger than T3.
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An example: Applying rules vs. learning them. An adaptive
system changes the rules of behavior given a change in the
situation. In a T3-system this is done at two different levels: At
one level the already known, previously used, rules are being
reactivated. This level employs anapoiesis. At the other, lower level
novel rules are being extracted.
A toy example of rule reactivation and extraction is a Wisconsin
card-sorting test used in clinical assessment of executive functions
(Berg, 1948). In this test a participant sorts cards from a deck to
match one of the properties of the reference cards placed in front
of the participant. The deck and the reference cars should be
matched either in color, shape or the number of items. Impor-
tantly, the participant is never told explicitly which property needs
to be matched and is only given feedback in form of “correct” or
“wrong”. In addition, the sorting rules unexpectedly change during
the task and the only indicator of a change is the feedback
“wrong”. The participant’s task is to ﬁnd out the new rule.
This test applies matching rules that are intuitive (e.g., match-
ing red color with another red color) and thus, in a way, already
known to the participant. For that reason, the problem can be
understood as engaging a T2-system: An anapoiesis-like process
activates one of the rules at the time (at top-1) from the repertoire
of the known rules (stored at top-2). Thus, no induction of novel
rules is necessary and hence, no traverse that operates below top-2
seems to be involved.
Neural networks implementing such pre-existing rules have
been created and demonstrated to mimic human performance
(Levine and Prueitt, 1989; Dehaene and Changeux, 1991; Parks
et al., 1992; Carter, 2000; Kaplan et al., 2006). In these systems, the
top-2 knowledge has been either hand-coded (e.g., Dehaene and
Changeux, 1991) or pre-trained (e.g., Carter, 2000)—in either case
acquisition of those rules requiring an intervention from a side of a
human programmer. Here, human programmers provided the
required deeper levels of adaptability that T2-systems could not
possess.
However, one can envision an extended version of Wisconsin
card-sorting test that requires the system to extract those rules
because they are not intuitive and already learned. There are many
rules possible that are not so intuitive. For example, the green
reference may have to be matched to a red deck card; or the count
of three items to a square shape, etc.
So, what if the test is made suddenly in such a way to be more
difﬁcult and not to rely on the most intuitive types of associations?
The number of potential rules becomes too large to be hand-coded
or pre-wired—thus, more like a real-life situation. The learning
time becomes longer and a number of errors becomes larger.
In that case a full T3-system is required to explore the space of
possibilities—largely by trial and error—and eventually acquire
new top-2 knowledge. The system has to use the feedback to make
changes at top-2 level iteratively. But upon successful learning, the
system can operate again quickly through anapoietic reconstruc-
tion from top-2 to top-1.
3.4.1. Peristasis
The adaptive capabilities of a T3-system can also be understood
from the perspective of regulating system variables key for
survival, or homeostasis (Cannon, 1932; Bernard, 1974), and the
distinction between homeostasis and allostasis (Sterling and Eyer,
1988; Sterling, 2004; Karatsoreos and McEwen, 2011). A T3-system
has adaptive capabilities that exceed those of allostasis. The
bottom traverse can adjust a T3-system to its habitat such that it
can perform allostasis more efﬁciently—i.e., fast reconstruction
means less allostatic load (McEwen and Stellar, 1993). If the
organism is exposed to extreme allostatic pressure e.g., cold, a
T3-system is able to adjust such that allostatic pressure is reduced,
by e.g. growing fur, and thus a smoother physiological operation is
ensured: The knowledge at top-3 is used to reconstruct properties
of the system at a higher level of organization. This adjustment
reﬂects a more elaborate form of adaptation to the surrounding
world than allostasis i.e., a higher level of organization, and can be
referred to as peristasis, from Ancient Greek word περί (peri)
meaning “around”. Peristasis refers to “staying stable by under-
standing (or grasping) the conditions for adaptation that apply to
the current situation”. In our extended, more difﬁcult version of
Wisconsin card-sorting test, peristasis would be achieved by the
acquisition of a new set of rules. That way, by activating one of
them, a T3-system keeps stable the most important variable of that
task: the feedback “correct”.
3.4.2. Logical abduction
T1- and T2-systems perform cybernetic operations that corre-
spond, respectively, to logical deduction and induction. There is an
advanced form of logical-deduction that can be performed with its
full power only by a T3-system. Anapoiesis of a T3-system can be
described as a use of past knowledge to guess which knowledge is
correct for the given situation and then evaluating the degree to
which the guess matches reality, and adjusting the discrepancies
that may appear. The corresponding guess-based logical operation
is known as abduction, introduced to account for the inferences
made on the basis of the best hypothesis given the available
knowledge (Peirce, 1903). Abduction involves validation and
correction of the guess, which requires iteration of the abducing
steps. In principle, a T2-system is sufﬁcient to implement logical
abduction provided that a large-enough knowledge-base exists at
top-2 level from which the hypotheses can be drawn. The process
of establishing and reﬁning this knowledge-base requires one
more traverse i.e., a T3-system. Only A T3-system can make a
guess through the anapoiesis of the existing knowledge, validate
the guess by interacting further with the environment, and then
adjust the knowledge-base as necessary: If the guess turns
incorrect, engagement of top-3 monitor-and-act units is needed.
This results in equipping the system with new knowledge for
abductions, which means that learning takes place by applying the
lowest of the three traverses. For example, in our extended
Wisconsin card-sorting test, the simple intuitive rules may be
abduced ﬁrst, but then rejected in light of the feedback. Another
rule may be abduced next, tested, rejected, etc. In a probabilistic
form, abduction is described by Bayes’ theorem, which has been
argued to be relevant for brain operations (Friston, 2010; Shipp
et al., 2013; Friston et al., 2012; Clark, 2013). However, Bayes’
theorem cannot provide a complete description of T3-systems and
hence, of the mind because there is nothing in Bayes’ approach
(footnote continued)
Importantly, however, if humanþmachine make a T4-system, it does not mean
that human speciesþmachine automatically make a T5-system. For a practopoietic
system to exhibit a certain degree of adaptability, all components of adaptive
processes must actually take place. This means that the lowest component of the
system (i.e., evolution by natural selection) has to affect the top level (the design of
machine). It does not seem that our technology affects the environment such that
downward pressure for adjustment is exerted all the way down to evolution of the
species. In contrast, our medical technology seems to have signiﬁcantly reduced the
pressure exerted on natural selection. Hence, technology seems to have a tendency
to serve as an alternative to adaptation by natural selection. That is, by increasing
our knowledge at the level of ideatheca we become more competent as a species,
resulting in less downward pressure on Darwinian selection for the species.
However, one can imagine a hypothetical scenario in which technology and
evolution would work both together to enable survival of the species. In an
Armageddon scenario in which human race has to evacuate Earth and has to rely
heavily on technology to survive on other planets for which we did not evolve, the
species may ﬁnd itself under strong pressure for evolving due to the limitations in
the degree to which technology can simulate the original conditions of the planet
earth. In that case a full T5 adaptive system or even higher would commence.
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that would correspond to the lowest traverse of the three—
learning probabilistic priors. Thus, Bayesian inferences enter
practopoietic systems through the top two traverses and hence,
thorough anapoiesis. The present theory offers a general approach
through T3-systems, covering also the learning of the knowledge
on the basis of which inferences are made.
4. Discussion
Much of the biological knowledge and skills can be stored in a
form of cybernetic variety, but it is only the levels of (self-)
organization that bring about the capacity to acquire knowledge.
Practopoietic theory proposes that these levels of organization are
achieved through traverses: Knowledge acquisition proceeds
always from general to speciﬁc.
The implication is that, to achieve intelligence, a system needs
not only variety in a form of e.g., network connectivity, hardware
components, if–then statements, etc., but also a feedback from
environment though which the variety is being adjusted. The key
contribution of practopoietic theory is the generalization of the
role of feedback: In any given system, the principles by which the
variety is adjusted can be also adjusted themselves by yet another
set of principles, and so on. And each set of principles can have its
own variety. This generalization results in a hierarchy that can in
principle grow indeﬁnitely. Each step in this hierarchy is one
traverse of cybernetic knowledge.
It follows that variety and traverses should be considered as
somewhat orthogonal in contributing towards the total intelli-
gence of the system: Variety is about knowing what to do;
Traverses are about acquiring this knowledge. Both components
are essential and neither alone can provide powerful intelligence.
Thus, no matter how much variety one may add to a system e.g., in
a form of neurons and connections, the system may still not be
able to produce human-like mental capabilities if it does not have
enough traverses.
Practopoietic theory allows us to analyze the adaptive compe-
tences of systems with differing numbers of traverses. These
competences range from simple information storage at T0 (no
traverses) and deductions from this information at T1, up to
induction of cybernetic knowledge at T2, and learning to perform
abduction at T3 (i.e., three traverses). The properties of different
systems are summarized in Table 1.
A conclusion is that a T1-system cannot possibly have enough
variety to deal with the combinatorial explosion of the real-life
situations of a human person. A T2-system does not solve this
problem satisfactorily either, as it requires forgetting old knowl-
edge when learning new one. But a T3-system appears to have
enough ﬂexibility to deal with the richness of a real life. This
system can change itself on two levels: it can learn abstract rules
and reconstruct from them concrete ones in a particular situation.
A T3-system takes also advantage of the fact that with more
adaptability levels the system can be smaller in total size and
yet, produce the same or higher amount of variety than systems
with fewer such levels.
Further analysis of the unique properties of T3-systems indi-
cated that what is particularly missing in our brain theories, and
also in our technology of AI algorithms (Kurzweil, 2005), is the
middle traverse of those systems—referred to as anapoiesis. Thus,
to address the mind–body problem successfully (Descartes, 1983;
Popper, 1999; Chalmers, 1996; Rust, 2009), practopoietic theory
suggests that it is necessary to consider T3-systems with variety
large enough to foster powerful anapoiesis.
Much of what we know about human cognition supports the
idea that our minds are T3-machines relying on anapoiesis:
4.1. Reconstructive memory
There is evidence that recall from human memory is recon-
structive by its nature (Schacter et al., 1998; Squire, 1992; Burgess,
1996), and that working memory capacity is directly determined
by reconstructive capabilities by a process known as chunking
(Miller, 1956; Cowan, 2001)28. Thus, both of these phenomena may
fundamentally rely on anapoietic reconstruction from general to
speciﬁc knowledge. Similarly, past stimulation builds expectancies
for later stimulus processing (Albright and Stoner, 2002; Nikolić,
2010). These context-induced expectancies possibly require ana-
poietic processes too: Expectations may be produced by adjust-
ments at the level top-1 and using the knowledge acquired
previously at top-2.
Efﬁcient management of expectancies is adaptive. As an animal
is behaving, it needs to activate different situational knowledge on
momentary basis. Every new situation that it enters requires
different knowledge on what can be expected to happen and what
may need to be done. For example, as a hedgehog leaves shelter,
enters open space, moves into woods, detects food, etc., each
situation implies different expectancies. These situations can
exchange literally every few steps of a walk. It is more efﬁcient
to reactivate existing knowledge in a form of working memory
contents and expectancies than to re-learn it from scratch.
4.2. Downward pressure for adjustment
Evidence indicates that the degree to which these working
memory and expectancy mechanisms are engaged depends on
downward pressure for adjustment. Slow, capacity-limited working
memory resources, or controlled processes, are engaged typically
when difﬁculties arise using quick and capacity-ample automatic
processes (Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977; Stanovich and West, 2000;
Table 1
Properties of systems that exhibit different number of traverses, from zero
traverses (T0) to three traverses (T3). All systems possess cybernetic knowledge
and variety. However, with increased number of traverses the adaptive capabilities
increase. For example, only a T3-system or higher is able to perform anapoiesis (see
text for explanation).
T0 T1 T2 T3
Cybernetic knowledge ✔ ✓ ✓ ✓
Variety ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Information ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Control – ✓ ✓ ✓
Supervision – – ✓ ✓
Anapoiesis – – – ✓
Homeostasis – ✓ ✓ ✓
Allostasis – – ✓ ✓
Peristasis – – – ✓
Storage of knowledge ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Knowledge deduction – ✓ ✓ ✓
Knowledge induction – – ✓ ✓
Knowledge abduction – – – ✓
28 Miller (1956) was the ﬁrst to point to the reconstruction in working memory
(or short-term memory) from long-term memory. He noticed that the memory
capacity for a string of letter was higher if it contained familiar combinations of
letter (e.g., IBMFBIKGB) than if it was completely random. He referred to this
process of organizing the stimulus as “chunking” and noted that it required existing
knowledge already stored in long-term memory. According to practopoietic theory,
this is the process of anapoiesis from long-term memory to working memory. Later,
similar properties have been shown for working memory storage in vision (Alvarez
and Cavanagh, 2004; Nikolić and Singer, 2007), and that visual chunking cannot be
made by combining any raw individual visual features but categories of objects
must exist in long-term memory (Olsson and Poom, 2005). Thus, the limitations in
the capacity of working memory seem to be limited by what can be reconstructed
from long-term memory.
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Kahneman, 2003, 2011). This suggests that the strength of the
downward pressure for adjustment plays a role in activating
anapoietic mechanisms. This pressure is particularly extensive
when the organism encounters novel situations to which it yet
has to ﬁnd suitable knowledge at top-129.
Similarly, evidence indicates that explicit long-term memories
are facilitated by downward pressure for adjustment exerted from
the contents of working-memory. Memories for verbal materials
are good when their relation to a certain context is processed i.e.,
when the contents are crunched intensively by working memory.
In contrast, the memory is poor when only sensory aspects are
processed (Craik and Lockhart, 1972). Similarly, in vision, long-
term memory for visual patterns improves linearly with the time
over which the patterns are processed in visual working-memory
(Nikolić and Singer, 2007). These results can be interpreted as
downward pressure for adjustment exerted by anapoietic opera-
tions on top-3 mechanisms to form novel long-term memory at
top-2 level.
4.3. Concepts
The capability of the human mind to conceptualize the world
(Barsalou et al., 2003; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005) may be accounted
for by anapoiesis of knowledge too. Our conceptual knowledge,
stored in long-term memory, consists of generalized, abstract rules
of interacting with the world (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2003). Hence, to
apply this knowledge to a speciﬁc case, there is always a need for a
matching operation: general principles should be matched to a
speciﬁc situation. This is where anapoiesis comes to aid: When an
object is encountered, it may be categorized by matching the
generalized knowledge at top-2 to the sensory inputs coming from
top. The result is the knowledge constructed at top-1 that is
speciﬁc to that object. Only then can the system interact with
that object successfully. For example, thanks to the anapoiesis of
concepts we may be able to drive a car and avoid collisions in
novel trafﬁc situations that never occurred before: General driving
rules are applied to each speciﬁc situation.
Because it stores all our concepts, the level top-2 can be
referred to as ideatheca (Greek for “place where concepts are
stored”). These concepts in ideatheca should be shielded from the
current activity at top-1, and should be adjusted only by the
operations of monitor-and-act units at top-3.
4.4. Ambiguities and problem solving
Biological minds are distinguished from machines largely for
their ability to resolve ambiguities (e.g., Kleinschmidt et al., 1998)
and cognitive problems in general (Sternberg and Davidson, 1995;
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). Anapoietic reconstruction may be the
key behind those intellectual capabilities. Natural to a T3-system is
a reiteration of anapoiesis in case that the ﬁrst round was not
successful in removing the pressure for adjustment. In case of
failure, the pressure remains and thus, the need to continue with
anapoiesis remains too. With each subsequent anapoietic iteration
chances to ﬁnd a solution may improve due to the work done by
the preceding anapoietic steps. Although they failed, they may
have brought the system closer to the solution than it was before.
An important part of that is the adjustment pressure that is, due to
the failures of anapoiesis, exerted on the lower level i.e., long-term
memory.
This dynamics of failure and pressure may underlie the process
of abduction. For example, in an ambiguous situation (Is this a
predator or a prey? A friend or a foe?), a T3-system may ﬁrst
abduce a hypothesis, and by doing so, drive the actions of the
sensory-motor system towards obtaining further sensory inputs to
test that hypothesis (e.g., by directing gaze). The hypothesis may
be then conﬁrmed or rejected. If rejected, abduction of a new
hypothesis may require concurrent changes at top-2 consistent
with the knowledge that the ﬁrst hypothesis was incorrect. The
process may then continue. This iterative dynamics of resolving
ambiguities, from top to top-2 (i.e., from behavior to ideatheca),
can eventually produce appropriate cybernetic knowledge at level
top-1 that is original and different from anything in the past to a
sufﬁcient degree to be qualiﬁed as an insight or a creative solution
to a problem.
4.5. Anapoietic cognition
In general, a property of the intermediate anapoietic traverse,
lying in the sandwich between sensory-motor loops and plasticity,
is that it allows for reorganization of knowledge without imme-
diately executing behavior. That is, anapoiesis may not act imme-
diately towards the main goal—i.e., towards resolving the main
downward pressure for adjustment. Instead anapoiesis may act
ﬁrst towards sub-goals—postponing the main behavioral actions
until the conditions for actions are ready. These sub-goals may
involve behaviorally covert operations, which, when becoming
elaborate, may manifest themselves as cognition.
Thus, we may hypothesize more generally that our entire
cognition is based on anapoiesis: An arrival at a Gestalt of a
percept (Köhler, 1929), attention successfully directed (Treisman
and Gelade, 1980; Posner and Petersen, 1990)30, stimulus recog-
nized (Furmanski and Engel, 2000), object mentally rotated
(Kosslyn et al., 1998), a logical conclusion inferred (Clark, 1969),
a decision reached (Bellman and Zadeh, 1970), a problem solved
(Sternberg and Davidson, 1995; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004)—may all
be end-results of anapoiesis. In cognitive science, the outcomes of
these activities are operationalized as working memory contents,
focus of attention, recall, imagination, expectancies, biases, accu-
mulation of evidence, etc. In practopoietic theory, these resulting
mental contents can collectively be referred to as cybernetic
knowledge at top-1 level activated from ideatheca.
29 The distinction between automatic and controlled processes is the most
pervasive dichotomy in psychological science. This distinction has been rediscov-
ered multiple times and has been characterized under different names, such as
automatic vs. controlled processes (Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977), System 1 vs.
System 2 (Stanovich and West, 2000), intuition vs. reasoning (Kahneman, 2003,
2011), verbal vs. non-verbal (Paivio, 2007), bottom-up vs. top-down (Posner and
Petersen, 1990), pre-attentive vs. attentive (Julesz, 1984; Treisman, 1980, 1985),
unconscious vs. conscious (Freud 1915/2005), dual processes (James, 1890), effort-
less vs. effortful (Hasher and Zacks, 1979), and reﬂexive vs. reﬂective (Lieberman,
2007). The common property of automatic, intuitive, pre-attentive processes is that
they are fast, require little attention, exhibit high processing capacity, and are
resilient to disturbances. These processes are also associated with little experience
of effort. Their main shortcoming is a relative lack of ﬂexibility. When we need a
new type of behavior that has not been executed or well-learned in the past, we
engage controlled attentive processes and reasoning. These mental activities
complete tasks with slower pace, exhibit less processing capacity, are more prone
to error in case of distraction, and are associated with conscious experience of
effort. For example, driving a car to work may be automatic and effortless, but
driving in a new city may require focus and attention.
30 Attention shares a lot of properties and resources with working memory
(e.g., Baddeley, 1993; Awh and Jonides, 2001; Mayer et al., 2007) so that it is often
not clear whether these are two separate phenomena or just different sides of the
same phenomenon. For example, the larger the working memory capacity for a
certain type of stimuli, equally so much faster is the visual search for those stimuli
in an attentional task (Alvarez and Cavanagh, 2004). According to the practopoietic
theory, the shared mechanism behind these phenomena is the anapoietic recon-
struction of knowledge.
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4.6. Awareness
Anapoietic process may also account for the capability of
biological systems to be aware of the surrounding world. Anapoi-
esis, has never a full internal “peace” of uninterrupted operation
like e.g., a computer algorithm would have when factoring a large
number (unlike a computer algorithm, anapoiesis is not boxed).
Instead, anapoietic process is continually bombarded by down-
ward pressure for adjustment as a result of an unceasing inﬂux of
sensory inputs. Anapoietic process has to integrate all the inputs
through its equi-level interactions, and this results in a form of
continuous peristasis—i.e., perpetually adjusted knowledge of
what is currently out there in the surroundings, even if it is
irrelevant for the current task.
That way the systems satisﬁes Ashby’s good regulator theorem
for the current environment. The great adaptive advantage is that
this knowledge can be used immediately if the distractor becomes
suddenly relevant for the task, or relevant in any other way. For
example, while hunting, an animal may have to integrate irrele-
vant auditory inputs such as the sounds of a water stream. But this
very integration enables detecting effectively changes in that
sound, which may then be essential for survival as they may
indicate e.g., the presence of a predator. Thus, eventually, the
inability to switch off and the necessity to integrate may lead to
particularly adaptive behavior: Stop the hunt and begin seeking
shelter. Thus, due to the equi-level interactions across the monitor-
and-act units of anapoiesis the knowledge is organized at the level
top-1 such as to take into account everything that enters through
senses, not only the information related to the current task. That
way, the system becomes aware of its surrounding world.
4.7. AI and understanding
The difference between T3- and T1-systems may be the difference
betweenwhat Searle (1980, 2009) referred to as understanding on one
hand, and the input–output mapping programmed into computer
algorithms on the other hand. Searle distinguishes between
semantics-based processing by humanmind and syntax-basedmanip-
ulation of symbols by machines. In his Chinese Room argument, Searle
illustrates that computer algorithms, that are being programmed and
thus provided the knowledge from the outside, cannot understand
what they are doing. Hence, such algorithms cannot think, and thus
cannot provide human-like artiﬁcial intelligence (or strong AI)31.
Practopoietic theory explains what these algorithms are missing: An
algorithm that operates through syntax is a T1-system, while under-
standing with all the conceptualizations requires at least a T2-system
with a rich ideatheca: Understanding comes through the very nature
of the transcendence of knowledge in a practopoietic system. The
activation of a concept from ideatheca into top-1 is in the same time
an abductive inference made on “symbols” and a symbol grounding
process (see footnote 2). Thus, to infer anapoietically is to simulta-
neously verify through feedback both the premises and the conclusion
of the inference. This in turn means that a full functioning T3-system is
needed, as rich ideatheca can be established only if monitor-and-act
units exist at level top-3. The existing artiﬁcial intelligence systems
that have T2-structure do not have any capability to enrich or improve
their ideatheca. Thus, only the human programmer is the one who
understands, while a T1-machine executes that code without any
understanding.
Hence, practopoietic theory prescribes that strong AI can be
created only with multi-level interactions with its environment based
on a T3-system architecture. This requires the system to acquire
general knowledge stored at ideatheca by its own interactions with
the environment i.e., without being hard coded by a programmer. The
system begins to understand and posses semantics when, during its
operations, bits of knowledge are used continuously from ideatheca to
set anapoietically the properties of the level top-1. It is the continuous
guessing (abduction) of this process and the continuous corrections of
those guesses that make the system effectively conscious.
The challenge for AI is then to endow artiﬁcial systems with the
needed seed-knowledge i.e., the most general learning mechan-
isms at the level top-3, that are suitable for acquiring knowledge in
ideatheca. Only then can the system achieve mind-like operations
that activate a more speciﬁc form of that knowledge at top-1,
which then in turn enables the system to exhibit intelligent overt
adaptive behavior at top.
4.8. The problem of downward causation
A question of how can mind affect body is one of the central
questions in the mind–body problem (Sperry, 1969, 1980; Campbell,
1990; Bedau, 2002; Bateson, 2004; Robinson, 2005; Thompson, 2007;
Noble, 2008a, 2008b). This interaction mental-to-physical is often
described as the problem of downward causation, and is an issue that
has been difﬁcult to resolve satisfactorily. On the one hand, from the
perspective of a biologist or psychologist it seems obvious that
downward causation takes place: Mental conﬂicts cause physical
symptoms; Thoughts cause behavior; Behavior causes expression of
genes (Freud, 1915/2005; Sperry, 1969, 1970, 1980, 1993; Noble, 2008a,
2008b). However, when dissected formally within the framework of
the theory of emergence (Meehl and Sellars, 1956; O’Connor, 1994),
the concept of downward causation seems to defy logic. Some
properties P of a system are said to emerge from other properties O
of the system if, and only if, P supervenes on O—i.e., if the whole
supervenes on its parts. For example, the behavior of a dynamical
system supervenes on the equations describing that system. Conse-
quently, system’s behavior emerges upwards from the properties of
those equations. The problem arises when one attempts to deﬁne
downward causationwithin such systems inwhich O supervenes on P.
The concept of downward causation seems not to bring any new
explanation to the dynamics of the system that has not been already
accounted for by upward causation. Downward causation becomes
hence “inconsistent” (Szentagothai, 1984), “mysterious” (Beadau, 1997;
Bedau, 2002) and “can at best supply a false sense of satisfaction”
(Robinson, 2005).
Practopoietic theory offers a way to reconcile these opposing views
from intuition about biological systems on the one hand and the strict
theoretical analysis of system dynamics on the other hand. The key
novelty that practopoiesis offers to system theory is the idea that one
should not attempt to understand adaptive systems as supervenient
relations between its P’s and O’s. Instead, the system should be
decomposed into poietic relations, which by their very nature are
not supervenient. Let us take the example of proteins and genes:
31 Searle illustrates this by putting a human into a hypothetical situation in
which the person follows blindly rules for mapping from input set of Chinese
characters to output set of Chinese characters. Importantly, the person is not
Chinese speaking. Thus, by making these rules elaborate enough and following
them accurately, an outside observer may have the appearance that the persons is
acting intelligently and is thinking, whereas in fact, the person has no under-
standing whatsoever of the context of the messages. Searle concludes that this
proves that such programmed symbolic rules, although possibly appearing to
generate intelligent behavior from outside, cannot be sufﬁcient to produce an AI
system capable of human-like understanding and thinking.
Notably, it follows from practopoietic theory that such a rule-based system is not
even possible to program in practice for real-life problems but only for simpliﬁed
toy problems. The insurmountable limitation is in the total amount of cybernetic
knowledge that would need to be stored. The total number of possible situations i.
e., possible sentences to be answered intelligently, using Chinese characters is too
large to be programmed by rules and if stored in a T1-system, the requirements for
the amount of needed memory storage may exceed the size of the universe. Thus,
human-like level of intelligence can be achieved only if the system stores knowl-
edge in a sufﬁciently generalized form, can extract and adjust this generalized
knowledge on its own, and has the capability of applying it to speciﬁc situations.
This requires a T3-system.
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Physiological functions of a protein supervene on its own atoms and
their spatial arrangement. However, physiological functions of a
protein do not supervene on the atoms underlying the DNA code for
that protein, nor does it supervene on the atoms of the ribosome that
synthetized the protein. Instead, the relation to those gene expression
mechanisms is the one of creation (poiesis). Practopoiesis focuses on
those poietic relations that exist among the components of the system.
By the uni-directionality of a poetic process, practopoietic
systems necessarily have higher and lower levels of organization
and it is the interactions among those levels (components,
monitor-and-act units) that enables us to provide a consistent,
non-mysterious explanation of interactions that involve effects
towards up and down. In other words, although the system as a
whole is autopoietic, its components mutually have allopoietic
relationships (allo stands for “other”). It is these allopoietic
relationships that are central for understanding adaptive behavior.
Consequently, the emergence of mind and behavior is not primarily
a question of the relationship between the elementary parts and the
whole, but between components at intermediate levels of aggregation,
which represent neither the wholeness nor the most elementary
parts. Poietic approach to self-organization and emergence offers a
very different perspective than does supervenient emergence.
In practopoietic systems, interactions with the environment
account for much of the causation towards down. The concept of
trickle-down information accounts for those downward effects. Effects
towards up are poietic and require knowledge shielding. Most notably,
the theory proposes existence of dedicated physical structures respon-
sible for storage of the knowledge at each level (e.g., ideatheca). As a
result, somewhat counter intuitively, the mind affects behavior
towards up—as the mind lays at one step lower level of organization
than the actual behavior.
4.9. Empirical predictions
The present insights into the functions of the three traverses
can be used to guide formulation of testable hypotheses about the
physiological underpinnings of an anapoietic brain. The three most
important empirical predictions are:
Prediction 1: Cognitive operations are implemented chieﬂy
through neural adaptation
The mechanisms of anapoiesis should have the following proper-
ties: First, they should operate on a time scales slower than spiking
activity but, in the same time, they should be faster than plasticity.
The time-scale should correspond to the pace with which our
mental operations occur: recognition, recall, decision, mental
imagery, and others. Studies on response times indicate that the
underlying physiological mechanism should not be faster than
about 100 ms and probably not slower than a second or two.
Second, the underlying mechanisms should be local i.e., they
should not be implemented through distributed network opera-
tions. The networks already serve the top-most traverse by
mediating sensory-motor loops. Thus, we should look for an
implementation separated from the network mechanisms. Finally,
the mechanisms of anapoiesis should effectively change the
properties of these networks.
One particular physiological mechanism seems to ﬁt these require-
ments. This mechanism is known as neural adaptation. If a stimulus
is presented continuously, neurons typically exhibit vigorous
response only initially (high ﬁring rates known as on-response),
and very soon, often already after 100–200 ms in the cortex, the
response reduces to much lower levels. This phenomenon is
known as neural adaptation. In cortex, neural adaptation has the
timing consistent within the timing of cognitive operations (e.g.,
Nikolić and Gronlund, 2002; Nikolić and Singer, 2007). Also, neural
adaptation takes place locally, within a cell.
Every sensory modality seems to exhibit such adaptation: vision
(Hurley, 2002), audition (Jerger, 1957; Ylikoski and Lehtosalo, 1985),
touch (Jones et al., 1974), and olfaction (Dalton, 2000). But the most
important reason to consider neural adaptation as the under-
pinning of anapoiesis is the fact that adaptation does not result
from fatigue of neurons (as has often been incorrectly presumed)
but that neural adaptation rather reﬂects a certain form of
cybernetic knowledge—i.e., the neuron has made a “decision” not
to ﬁre, or to ﬁre more. This is easily seen if the stimulus to which
the neuron has adapted is suddenly removed (the so-called off-
response). Fatigue hypothesis would predict a further reduction in
neural activity (a combination of a reduced drive into the cell and
the fatigue). In contrast, what happens is that off-responses are
typically as vigorous as the initial on-response (e.g., Nikolić et al.,
2009). Importantly, off-responses are also more differentiated i.e.,
more informative about each particular stimulus than are the on-
responses (Nikolić et al., 2009).
Neural adaptation shapes the response properties of the network.
Responses to subsequent stimuli depend strongly on the properties of
the stimuli to which the cells have adapted (e.g., Eriksson et al., 2010,
2012). Thus during adaptation, while becoming less sensitive to one
type of inputs the system becomes more sensitive to other inputs.
These data are consistent with the function of the middle traverse
in a T3-system. Neural adaptation is thus a mechanism that can
provide sufﬁcient ﬂexibility (network changes) and context sensi-
tivity (reﬂect the properties of the current situation) to quickly re-
route the ﬂow of information to thus, to produce novel sensory-
motor mappings within the network. The mechanisms of neural
adaptation are hence in the position to implement anapoietic
machinery. The implication is that any current pattern of adaptation
across neurons (i.e., neurons that are, and are not adapted at any
given time) constitute the neural correlates of: recognition of
perceived objects, directed attention, contents of working memory,
decisions made, etc. In contrast, properties of anapoiesis are
inconsistent with the idea of being implemented by dedicated
brain areas32.
Prediction 2: The mechanisms of neural adaptation learn
If the above hypothesis is correct and neural adaptation is one
of the key mechanisms responsible for anapoietic processes in
the mind, the following prediction necessarily follows: The
rules by which neurons adapt are not ﬁxed but are being
learned. As we acquire new knowledge i.e., enrich ideatheca,
we learn when to adapt our neurons (and when not)—the
properties of adaptation mechanisms depending on the history
of interactions with similar stimuli. This in turn means that the
properties of neural adaptation mechanisms can be altered by
appropriate experimental manipulation.
32 One possibility that my come to mind is that anapoiesis is implemented by
specialized cortical areas. For example, areas located high on the cortex hierarchy,
such as the frontal cortex or infero-temporal cortex, may be speculated to supply
the anapoietic function by determining the processing of information in classically
lower brain areas e.g., sensory and motor cortices. There are several reasons why
this hypothesis cannot stand. First, adaptability offered by a tri-traversal system is
equally needed for all species that have nervous systems, including those that do
not even have a cortex. Therefore, this hypothesis would imply that all the other
brains, without these higher areas, are T2-systems—which contradicts basic
postulates of practopoietic theory. Second, the general anatomy of the cortex does
not satisfy the prerequisite of uni-directional poietic relation. Anatomically, all
cortical areas are nearly identical and are reciprocally connected. This arrangement
does not allow for transcendence of cybernetic knowledge (higher level being a
speciﬁc case of more general knowledge at the lower level) and shielding the
knowledge at lower levels from the dynamics at higher levels. Thus, while higher
brain areas make humans more capable of cognition in comparison to other species
those brain areas do not make a difference between T2- and T3-systems. Rather
than adding a traverse, the additional brain areas enable unique cognitive abilities
of humans by adding cybernetic variety.
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Prediction 3: Ideatheca
The physiological underpinning of ideatheca is unlikely to be
the synapse. First, by their nature, synapses are an integral part
of the top-1 level, and hence, cannot store top-2 knowledge in
the same time. Second, synapses do not seem to have the
stability required to store life-long memories characteristic of
ideatheca (e.g., Holtmaat and Svoboda, 2009). Therefore, yet
another surprising prediction that can be derived from a tri-
traversal theory of mind: Our semantic knowledge, such as
skills and declarative facts, is not primarily stored in synapses
i.e., in the network architecture (although this architecture
needs to be ﬁne-adjusted too). Rather, this knowledge that sits
available to the mind even if not being activated in a while
(sometimes in years) is stored by some other means—those that
determine when and how a cell will adapt its responses. These,
currently unknown structures should have the following prop-
erty: They should be shielded from the activity of the network
such that the network cannot directly alter these structures.
These structures should be altered only by specialized monitor-
and-act units that have very general knowledge about when
such learning should be made. These most-general monitor-
and-act units should lay at top-3 level and hence, should be
driven by gene-expression mechanisms.
4.10. What is thought?
Finally, practopoietic theory allows us to address the important
question on what the nature of a thought is (e.g., Baum, 2004). The
most fundamental difference between an anapoiesis-capable T3-
system and the classical approach based on T2-systems is in the
number of traverses that need to be engaged during a cognitive
act. Given that in each of the two systems the lowest traverse
provides learning, which is normally slower than the act of
thinking, only the traverses that remain can serve the mental
operations. This means that the classical approach allows for only
one traverse while an anapoietic system has two. Thus, a classical
system uses a single traverse to implement both the mental
operations and generation of behavior. A T3-system separates
those in two traverses, one on top for sensory-motor loops and
another for anapoiesis. This implies a fundamentally different
nature of the thought process presumed by the two approaches.
Rather than relying on the global dynamics of a neural network by
the classical approach, local feedback-driven adjustments of net-
work components through neural adaptation produces mental
operations in a T3-system. Thus, the present theory suggests the
following: A thought is an adaptation.
The function of the network is then to execute the sensory-
motor loops and thus, to test each newly created adaptation
pattern by collecting feedback. This anapoietic approach is
consistent with the following properties of the mind: (i) reliance
on interactions with its surroundings (e.g., 4EA-cognition: embo-
died, embedded, enactive, extended, and affective) (e.g., Gibson,
1977; Brooks, 1991; Noë, 2012); (ii) logical abduction (Peirce,
1903), and (iii) semantic understanding as opposed to syntactical
symbol manipulation characteristic of machines (Searle, 1980).
In addition, adaptation can be contrasted to computation (in a
narrow meaning of that concept). A computation: (i) turns sensory
inputs into states that represent properties of the outside world
(symbols); (ii) is most effective if the operations of inference are
isolated from the outside world (boxed); (iii) does not bring new
information about the outside world besides that already present
in the input symbols (deduction); (iv) the meaning is assigned
to states i.e., symbols are grounded (see footnote 2), by a process
separate from the inference machinery that manipulates
those symbols (syntactic); and (v) for the same inputs reliably
produces the same outputs (faithful). In contrast, an adaptive
thought combines computation iteratively and is guided by feed-
back to produce something more substantial and more alive:
(i) Adaptation mechanisms take as input cybernetic knowledge
at one level of organization (monitor-and-act units) and extract as
output new cybernetic knowledge at another level of organization
(other monitor-and-act units); (ii) This extraction of new knowl-
edge can only be effective if the system is not closed but integrates
continual feedback from the outside (permeable); (iii) In anapoie-
tic systems new knowledge is extracted through an iterative
sequence of guesses and tests (abduction); (iv) Operations neces-
sary for symbol grounding are implemented by the same pro-
cesses that produce abductive inference—i.e., the process of
inference is indistinguishable from the process of extracting
meaning (semantics); (v) The outputs of adaptive systems depend
considerably on the feedback received from the environment,
opening possibilities for producing something new (creative). As
a result, the processes underlying the emergence of computation
can only be described as supervening, whereas adaptation can be
understood also as a self-organized process of non-supervening
poietic relations. The properties of thought presumed by classical
and anapoietic systems are summarized in Table 2.
5. Outstanding questions for future studies
(1) Do mechanisms exist in the brain that enable the process of
neural adaptation to learn?
(2) Can a T3-system with a large ideatheca provide a foundation
for a general theory of psychology?
(3) How can practopoiesis guide development of artiﬁcial
intelligence?
(4) Can the principles of practopoietic hierarchy help us better
deﬁne life and understand its origins?
Table 2
Two different approaches towards answering the question: What is thought? The table makes the contrast between the classical and anapoietic approaches. The classical
approach is based on T2-systems, having one traverse for executing mental operations and a separate one for learning. In contrast, anapoietic approach is based on T3-
systems, employing in total two traverses for executing mental operations—one traverse for generating behavior and a separate one for mental operations bona ﬁde. The
anapoietic approach agrees with several previous theoretical works suggesting external components to cognition, importance of semantics in symbol treatment and
operations based on logical abduction. In addition, anapoiesis offers several new insights into the nature of the thought process.
Classical (T1/2) Anapoietic (T2/3)
Operation Computation Adaptation
Input and output Symbols Monitor-and-act units
Relation to surroundings (Gibson; Brooks; Nöe; supra) Boxed Permeable
Logical operation (Peirce, supra) Deduction Abduction
Symbol treatment (Searle, supra) Syntax Semantics
Repeatability Faithful Creative
Emergence Supervening Non-supervening
Physiological implementation Electrochemical neural activity Processes of neural adaptation
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(5) Does practopoietic theory suggest answers for most difﬁcult
questions in philosophy of mind and epistemology?
6. Conclusions
In conclusion, adaptive intelligence requires not only massive
storage of knowledge in a form of a rich network architecture but
also a sufﬁcient number of adaptive levels to acquire, adjust and
manipulate that knowledge. Our brain theories, empirical investi-
gations, and AI algorithms should consider systems with three
such adaptive levels (T3-systems) capable of producing anapoiesis
and having a large ideatheca.
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